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r. THE OUTBhEAK OF WAR I.N ~914 
A. Introduction 
This study will consider the ~ture of the challenge 
offered to Austria by Jugoslav nationalism. Austria's 
nationality policy will be considered, to determine whether 
part of the blame for Serbian agitation is due to an unintel- 1 
ligent domestic policy. The nature of the Jugoslav movement 
will be analyzed, with particular attention to evidences of 
propaganda and activity directed against Austria-Hungary. 
And, finally, the Sarajevo plot will be studied, to determine 
first, whether it was the inevitable result of anti-Austrian 
of I activities tolerated by Serbia; second, whether a measure 
guilt may be ascribed to Serbia for allovdng the plot to 
11 develop, 
,, 
II B. Problems Menacing the Peace of Europe li 
II 
I! 
II 
,, 
II 
.I I, \; 
II 
In the two decades preceding the Sarajevo assassination 
there had arisen in Europe a number of unhealthy conditions, 
each of which menaced the peace of the European community. 
Chief among these were: the system of alliances, economic 
rivalry, imperialism, nationalism, and finally, tremendously 
I increased armaments. 
J In 1879 a defensive alliance was concluded between '! 
11 II Austria-Hungary ana Germany. which be~ame the Trijite. Alliande 
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Russia or France attacked a me'Qlber of theAllfa~-ce -w~thou-;--[ 
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direct provocation, the others should lend their assistance. I 
In 1892 the French and Russian governments drew up a 
military convention, which was given the force of a treaty, 
providing that if France should be attacked by Germany, or by 
Italy supported by Germany, Russia should employ all her 
forces against Germany. lf Russia should be attacked by 
Germany, or Austria supported by Germany, France should 
employ all her forces against Germany. Furthermore, if any 
of the powers of the Triple Alliance Should mobilize, France 
and Russia should immediately proceed to mobilize, and move 
all available forces to the frontiers. 
Early in the twentieth century England began to aban-
don her policy of isolation, and draw closer to France and 
her all;>r, Russia. Differences bet\'Jeen France and England, 
and between Russia and England, were settled by treaties 
drawn up in 1904 and 1907, and the three countries joined 
in what is known as the Triple Entente. 
Europe was thus divided into two systems of alliances. 
Ostensibly both \'I ere defensive, but their character was 
considerably changed by the military conventions that sup-
plemented them. ~urthermore, the fact that the terms of 
the alliances and the military conventions were generally 
secret, fostered international distrust. As Schmitt says, 
"On the eve of the tragedy of Sarajevo the tv~o great dip-
lomatic groups stood face to face."* It was evident that 
¥~----
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-- I -,~=o=ll=.;ny ~:i.sS~e between two great powers would tend to involve all 
.. 
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·: 
jl the other powers of the alliances. 
I 
The importance of economic rivalry as a cause of the /! 
I war is often over-estimated. Germany was, of course, enjoy-
1
1 
II I 11 ing a remarkable industrial and commercial growth, and Eng-
' land's markets were affected. But beyond a certain amount j! 
'
il ! il of bitterness over the loss of business, the direct results 
li of economic rivalry were small. II I· 
l' Indirectly, however, the industrial expansion led to a 
I 
II 
demand for spheres of influence or colonies, which would 
provide sources for raw materials and new markets. Instances 
! 
of this were the French annexation of Morocco, the Berlin-to-
II, Bagdad Railway, and the English control of Persian oil 
, fields. 
One of the worst evils was the spirit of nationalism, 
which manifested itself in many forms. By emphasizing the 
sovereignty of the state, often to a point of j'ingoism, 
nationalism discouraged international co-operation and good 
will, and set up instead standards of national honor and 
prestige which tended to oecome fetiches. State boundaries, 
however, often cut through sections of homogeneous populations: 
and in many states, particularly the Dual Monarchy, the alien I) 
I population had a growing sense of nationality and kinship · 
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~I Finally, there was the evil of militarism and ammaments. , 
The fear of having to face in battle not merely one country, 
i but a p~Jerful alliance, encouraged armaments. Imperialism 1 
demanded larger navies as a means of aiding to secure and 1
1 
hold new territories. Nationalism fostered armament as a 
means of asserting the sovereignty and dignity of the state. 
Finally, each armament increase gave occasion to distrust, 
and a corresponding increase on the part of rival powers. 
An especially dangerous feature of the increased arm-
aments was its effect on diplomacy. Military power increased 
diplomatic prestige, and in the event of a crisis the threat 
of force offered a tempting weapon. Furthermore, the mili-
tary leaders would make their influence felt on diplomacy, 
and their impatience with calm and deliberate procedure would 
be reflected in the handling of any crisis. 
c. The Succession of Crises 
A numl::i·er of incidents, some of them almost wrecking the 
ii j1 peace of Europe, Dore witness to the underlying causes for 
II unrest. r.ehe first of these was the .b1ashoda incident. A 
II French expedition for the purpose of extending the French 
d I' possessions to the upper Nile reached l!,ashoda in 1898. 
1
1
. Soon after, an English expedition to reconquer the Sudan in 
# j; 
rl :::tn:::.:: :~i:::::::co:r::::tu::::r;:a:::h:::: w::ei~n::: I 
___ ll_=a ~~-of t:_e Engl~ s~c-:-~:~s:~--~~ _ r=~~e~~-- ~r ~~c:-~e r _ ~ t~n d ·-=~~=--=.A=p=r=i=:t=tll===~ , ~, ~-, ~-, ~--~-I r~~ -~ ~ ---------------- --- I 
~ I ! q 
. II 
'I 
t ' 
Laze 
: 
!; 
5 
..... ····--··· ii ·---·-·-·-- -- • .• - -- • 1 ... ···-··· ·-···· ... ···- ·• -· ·- ...... . .... c . := -.. =:· .. ::_.:;·::~ ..... =::::· .. : :: : ·-.·:·:·:· ····-···- ..... ::_ )' ::::::::=:::..:·~==··. __ -· 
of 1904, b1rance and England signed an agreement establishing ~I 
4), 
li 
i! 
i! recognized spheres of influence in Africa. ·rhis agreement 
1
1 
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,I 
! 
provided the basis for the Entente Uordiale. 
~ ; 
,, 
li A second African crisis came in March, 1905. 
\ 
I \'/hila France 
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was taking measures designed to trans£orm Morocco into a 
protectorate, Kaiser Wilhelm II, without notice, disembarked 
at 'rangier and. addressed the Sultan as an independent sover-
eign; announcing his intention of safeguarding the interests 
of Germany in morocco. This was followed by Germany's demand 
'1 for a European conference to settle the Moroccan question. 
1, 
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While ll-ermany succeeded in forcing the calling of a confer-
ence, which met at Algeciras, her demands were not met, 
chiefly because of the co-operation between England and 
France. The result was a settlement favorable to France. 
The final Moroccan incident, which came in 1911, was 
much more ugly in its character. When France proceeded to 
establish control over Morocco, without officially notifying 
Germany, the German warship, Panther, was dispatched 
dir, ostensibly to protect German citizens. 1l'his threat of 
force was answered in kind by Lloyd Geor~e, in his Mansion 
House speech, and Germany finally recognized the position of 
] 1rance in IJ.orocco, securing as compensation the cession of 
large areas of French territory in the Congo. 
Peacea0le settlements were reached in each of these 
incidents. But in the meantime, the Halkan question had 
been developing, and presented a crisis, in 1908, when 
!• Austria annexed Hosnia and Herzegovina, which she had 
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occupied since the Congress of Berlin, in 1878. Russia 
prates ted 1oud1y, and public}opinion in :::>erbiA- was inflamed. 
The Serbian army was mobilized, but finally Serbia reluct-
antly accepted the annexation, upon the advice of Russia 
and England. Although the crisis was theoretically ended, a 
great amount of bitterness remained in Serbia and Russia. 
! 
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In 1~12 and 1913 occurred the Balkan Wars, which threat-
ened,for a time, to cause a general European conflict, and 
which left the Balkans .. in the chaotic condition which per-
mitted the outbreak of the World War. 
As the result of the o~pression and harsh rule of 
Christian pro5inces by the Turkish government after the 
young Turk Revolution, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and 
Greece united in a determination once and for all to drive 
Turkey from Euro~e, and in October, 1912, dec1ared war upon 
II 
II 
II 
,1 her. The al1ies surprised the world by destroying the militar 
'I 
l1 
I 
power of the Turks, and in less than two months Turkey held 
in Europe only a small strip of land around Constantinople. 
In the preparations for the war the Balkan powers had 
outlined the division of the spoils, which included an out-
let to the sea for Serbia. However, in ~he treaty negotiations! 
·I 
'!I 
set up as an independent state. 
! 
~he Great ~owers, headed by Austria, insisted that Albania be 
I None of the Balkan powers, with the exception of Bulgaria,. 
I I I! secured, in entirety, the territory which had been guaranteed . 
I 
•I 
11 it in the agreements of the alliance, and aocotdingly, the , 
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itorial agreement. When this was refused the second Balkan 
War began, in 1913. 
7 
Bulgaria was defeated by tpe other Balkan powers, and 
these states, particularly Serbia, came out of this bitter 
struggle with considerable increases in territory. Another 
result of the Second Balkan War was a change in the political 
alignment in the Balkans. Bulgaria was alienated from Serbia, 
and henceforth tended to aid.e VJi th Austria, while the loyalty 
of Rumania to the Triple Alliance could no longer be counted 
upon. 
One thing had been settled---the problem of Turkish rule 
in Europe, which had. formed. the chief element in the long 
discussed "Eastern Question". But Sorel had prophesied, years 
before, regarding the Eastern ~uestion, that "on the day 
when that shall have been considered solved, Europe will 
inevitably see propounded the 'question of .Austria!" *There 
was now a new aspect to the Balkan problem, v1hich was eoon to 
wreck the peace of the world. 
D. The Outbreak of the War 
iJ 
II 
d 
II 
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II 
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In June, 1914, came the final crisis which led to univer-\ 
sal war. On June 28, while attending army maneuvers in 
recently annexed Bosnia, ArchdUke Francis Ferdinand, heir to 
the Austrian throne, was assassinated in the streets of 
Sarajevo. The assassins were ~osnian subjects but it devel-
I 
* P •• Sorel, The Eastern ~~uest ion in the Eighteenth Century, 2661 
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fostered ~n r oped that the conspiracy had been instigated and 
Belgrade, the capitol of Serbia. 
On July 23, the Austrian government, as a result of the 1: 
outrage, presented to Serbia an ultimatum, comprising ten I 
points. Immediate and unconditional acceptance was demanded, 11 
and when, on July 25, the Serbian reply did not meet this 
•I 
'.I 
,, 
II ,, 
demand, diplomatic relations were broken off. Austria declare~~· 
war on Serbia on July 28. 
Russia, to support Serbia, began mobilization when 
Austria crossed the Serbian frontier. She began partial mobil-
ization on July 29, and on the following day complete mobil- I 
izntion was ordered. This presented a crisis to Germany. She 
realized a war involving either France or Russia must of 
necessity involve the other. Since Russian mobilization was 
slow, her plan had been to immediately march on France 
through Belgium, paralyze the country, then turn back to 
meet Russia before Russian mobilization could be completed. 
Every day of Russian mobilization would endanger the success 
of the plan, and Germany, on July 31, sent an ultimatum to 
Russia demanding cessation of mobilization within twelve 
hours, and at the same time demanded of France a pledge of 
neutrality. When Russia did not answer the ultimatum Germany 
declared war on he~ on August 1, and on France's refusal to 
pledge neutrality declared war on her on August 3. England 
demanded that Germany respect Belgian neutrality , and upon 
I 
1 Germany's refusal declared war upon her on August 4. 
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The rapidity with which war swept over Europe proves that I 
there were many evils in the European system, but these do 
not properly fall within the scope of this study. \'/hy, 
however, did the Sarajevo crisis)provoke war when other crises 
I 
had been settled peaceably? Bismarck had prophesied that the I 
i World War would start in t•1e Balkans. In the final analysis, 
a Balkan incident started the war because here only, among 
all the danger points of Europe, a modus vivendi had not 
been attained. The Balkan peninsula was a focal point of 
many forces. Unde~ground, tnere was a constant shifting, 
finally there came the eruption at the most dangerous point--
where the growing Serbian nationalism struck at the integrity 
of the Hapsburg empire. 
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II. THE JUGOSL.4V rROBLEM OF THE IBFSBURG EMPIRE 
A. Austrian Nationalities 
Before the war the Hapsburg Empi:re was a conglomeration 
'1 
i! 
'I 
I 
;j 
I 
:I 
•i 
il ,, 
II 
:I 
:I ii 
II 
of some twenty rac4al or nationality groups. Out of a total :1 
population of 51,000,000, there were within the bounds of the II 
Monarchy 7,300,000 Jugoslavs. However, the Jugoslavs com-
prised 87% of the population of Croatia-Slavonia, and 96% of 
,I 
\) 
II j! 
Ill 
I 
the population of the annexed provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.! 
Obviously, in these sections assimilation was impossible, 
whereas a growth of national consciousness would inevitably 
endanger the territorial integrity of the Empire. 
The Slovenes, numbering 1,400,000, while a part of the 
Jugoslav family, did not provide a real nationality problem. 
The other two branches within the Empire were the Serbs and 
the Croats. Ethnically there is no difference between Serb 
and Croat. Linguistically the only difference is that the 
/, Serbs use the Cyrillic characters in writinc. The one 
- ,. ,. 
I! 
mmportant difference is in religion. The Serbs are Orthodox, 
the uroats Roman Catho~ic. This religious difference, 
however, had widely separated the two Jugoslav groups. The 
Croats were traditionally loyal to the Hapsburg throne, and 
until the years immediately preceding the war, there existed 
a strong d1 strust between the two branches. The uniting of 
the _Croats and the Serbs, and the growth of the Serbian 
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national idea, formed the essence of the Jugoslav problem of 
the Empire, a problem which was to be solved only by catas-
trophe. To what extent this problem was due to Austro-
Hungarian policies will be studied ·in this chapter. 
B. Oroatia-Slavonia 
Croatia-Slavonia, with an area of 16,423 square miles, 
had before the war a population of approximately 2,500,000~ 
Jugoslavs comprised 87% of the total population, with Croats 
outnumbering the Serbs three to one. The chief occupation 
of the province vJas agriculture. The literacy figure was 
44%. 
The legal status of Croatia was defined by the Hungarian-
Croatian Compromise of 1868. By the Compromise, Croatia had 
provincial autonomy, vdth freedom in internal administration, 
judicial affairs and education. Otherwise the provinces ~ere 
1i administered by the ban, who was nominated by the Hungarian 
., 
,I 
II 
I 
government, and was thus an agent of Magyar rather than Croat 
policy. The Hungarian parliament, which included a Croat 
delegation, also controlled the joint affairs. 
Croats had been loyal to the Hapsburg throne, having 
fought for the Emperor in 1848. Dut union of Dalmatia with 
Croatia-Slavonia, promised in the first paragraph of the 
Compromise of 1868, had steadfastly been prevented, since 
_jj _ suc~~--u-ni-~~-\VO~~~ mean a modification of Dualism. In the 
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I tained Magyar control in the face of nn overwhelming Jugoslav 
I 
majority, by corrupt electoral practices, censorship, and 
a policy of playing off the long-standing hostilities between 
~~ Serbs and Croats."' 
In 1903 a delegation of Austrian Serb deputies asked aid 
for their fello\v-nationals in uroa.tia, out they were refused. 
"The Croats, long the most :loyal nation of the Monarchy, 
definitely lost confidence in the curing of their grievances 
with the help of the Dualistic system."** 
I With the overthrow of Kb.uen-Hedervary, in 1903, after a 
I 
1 regime that had lasted twenty years, there was a marked 
j growth of Croatian nationalism. In 1905, the Croats united 
J vd th the Magyar opposition, during the Hungarian Constitution-
·1 II al crisis. In the Resolution of Fiume, forty deputies from 
j Croatia, Dalmatia and lstria pledged the support of Croats in 
the struggle of the Hungarian nation for its rights. The 
price of this support was to be the union of Dalmatia with 
Croatia, and relief from intolerable conditions within 
Croatia. 
,I 
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Shortly afterward, twenty-six Serb deputies at Zara 
agreed with the Fiume program, and declared themselves in 
favor of joint political action of Croats and Serbs, on the 
grounds that the t~o were one nation by blood and language.~* 
II. :J aszi, 366-369; Drage, 458-459 
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Once the Hung~rlan crisis was past, the Magyars deserted f 
their allies, and as a result neither the Dalmatian union nor I 
i 
the Croatian reforms were obtained. However, a Serb-Croat 
coalitian had been formed, and it was to prove impregnable 
before attempts of the Magyars to smash it. 
I In January, 1908, Baron Paul Rauch was made Ban of Croatia. 
I 
In the elections which followed soon after, there was a 
decisive ~1ctory for the coalition. ~aron Rauch countered by 
dissolving the Diet before it had time to even begin its work., 
:I and a period of absolutism was instituted. .Accusations of 
I treason and political arrests were resorted to in a further 
I attempt to break the Serb-Croat coalition, culminating in the 
~~ Ag:ram High Treason trial. 
1 In this trial fifty-three prominent Serbs were indicted 
for treasonable acts. The trial was obviously unjust, and 
instead of destroying the coalition, it strengthened it, and 
gave it added prestige. Another outcome of the Agram trial 
was the Friedjung libel action, in which it was demonstrated 
that Austria was attacking the Serb-Croat coalition by means 
of forged documents. 
Baron Rauch's oppressive regime ended in 1910. New 
attempts to win electoral support for the government failed, 
and finally, early in 1911, the Constitution of Croatia 
was suspended, and Baron Cuvaj, as Royal Commissioner, ruled 
witn absolute powers.+ 
*seton-Hatson, The Southern Slav io,:.uestion, passim 
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~s a result of the Hungarian policy, the Croats were 
wavering in their loyalty to the Empire, and began to join 
with the Serbs in considering the possibilities of help from 
beyond the boundaries. Baron von Musulin, an Austrian foreign 
official, returning to Croatia in 1~13, after an absence of 
many years, reported: 
I found the opposition between Serbs and 
Croats largely vanished, at least among the intel-
ligentsia, and, in consequence, a significant weaken-
ing of the Croatian idea •••• The intellectual world 
was livin~ under the impression of the great develop-
ment of Serbdom on the other side of the Drnve. ln 
many places I encountered the belief that national 
salvation must come from that direction •••• The pol-
itical activity of Serbia made itself felt in all 
directions.""* 
c. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Far more important than Croatia-Slavonia, as a national-
ity problem to the Empire, were the provinces of Bosnia-
I
I Herzegovina. 
of the Hapsburg Empire, Bosnia-aerzegovina, after centuries 
Whereas Croatia had for cent"'llries been part 
I 
of chafing under terrible oppression by the Turks, vdth her 
only hope in dreams of eventual fr·eedom, had been handed 
,I "'F. von Musulin, Das _g~"!-1~~ am ___ -!3allp1_a ~_!,_~ql!9t~LEY' __ ~c_h_!Il_it t_,.£,14:~~---~ 
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to Austria~Hungary to occupy and administer, at the Treaty of·r:-
Berlin, 1878. 
Racially, the population in 1910 was 96% Serbo-Croat, as 
compared with 87~b in Croatia. Ylhile in Croatia three-fourths 
of the Jugoslavs were Uroats, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
Croats constituted less than one quarter of the Jugoslav 
population. ~urthermore, bosnia adjoined Serbia, and Belgrade 
was the natural cultural centre of the Seruian elements of 
t.he population • .li'inally, .Bosnia was extremely backward, with 
aoout 90% illiteracy. The provinces were poor, and had 
suffered greatly from •..eurkish misrule. Only great progress 
in the satisfaction of dire material needs could remove the 
strong desire for lioerty which had grown up during the 
Turkish rule. I 
Administration of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina .· 
was in the hands of the Joint Finance Minister of the Empire. 
In the period between 1878 and the annexation, order was 
1
1
1
i
1 
restored and material conditions improved somev1hat. 
while Austriari apologists point to the difference between 
I! 
But, 
II ,. 
Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, and Belgrade to show the ben-
efits of Austrian rule, there is ample evidence that con-
ditions throughout the provinces were only superficially 
improved. The system of land O\mership was entireJy unsatis-
factory, VJith the emancipation of the peasants proceeding 
very slowly. Educational progress was slov"J, and Baernreither 
reports that in 18~2 there \"Jere but 328 schools, with 17,540 
I, pupils, while in 1905 _on]:.y_ljdL_~f-~~~-children_of schooLage __ \. _________ c 
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.. c.S assimilation was impossible, Austria 1s aim during the I 
'I ., 
(\.· 
1\ 
I 
I 
period of occupation was to transform the desire for indepen-~ 
dence into a Bosnian nationalism, and to prevent the growth . 
I 
of fraternal feeling between Bosnians and Serbs. To this end ! 
Baron Kallay, Minister from 1882 to 1903, tried to create a 
Bosnian language, stimulated local manufactures, and even 
suppressed his own "History of the Serbs", which recognized 
the identity of Bosnians and SA~hA.**· 
In the latter years of the occupntion, 
190!3, there was a marked growth in Bosnian 
particularly afterl 
political conscious-
J 
ness, and with the overthrow of the Obrenovic regime in 
Serbia, an increase in the Serbian irridentist idea. Joseph 
Baernreither, in 1908, when he revisited Bosnia after an 
absence of sixteen years, reported: 
Politically, I found a completely changed sit-
uation. When I was here for the first time, in 
1892, the atmosphere was one of energetic progress, 
well considered and full of eager hopefulness for 
the future; today, inactivity, doubt, apprehensive-
ness are the note. •** 
! 
Austrian rule, he found, was unpopular, and blamed for al] 
I Austria, had large circulations. But while there was, within 
lj,l *Baernreither, 27 
evils. Serbian inspired papers, which systematically attacked 
**Buchan, 161 
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co~try districts were untouched, and the Croatian section of' 
the population had not begun to look to Serbia. In genera1, 
the demands were for a constitution, and for independence 
within the framework of the Empire.* 
The growth of Serbian nationalism, together with the 
constellation of events occuring at the time of the Young 
Turk Revolution, led the government, on Oct. 7, 1908, to 
proclaim, as a fait accompli, the annexation of the provinces• 
In the European capitals, excite~ent ran high over the 
announcement. Particularly in Serbia, which regarded Bosnia-
Herzegovina as irrffdenta, there was loud protest, but event-
ually this attitude had to be abandoned. 
Within Bosnia the chief :feeling v1as one of expectancy. 
Baernreither, in 1909, reported: 
The whole population is in a state of tension. 
Everyone is waiting to see some change in the rela-
tion of the Bosnian state to the empire as a whole, 
in its administration, and in economic conditions ••• 
The action of the Monarchy has made a decisive im-
pression here; even the Serbs have been affected by 
the collapse of Serbian heroics; and men's eyes, 
instead of turning outward, are now directed to the 
funure of the country under the Hapsburg sceptre •••• 
The existing·relation between the provinces and the 
I 
there is a I 
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II Monarchy no longer suffices. In Bosnia, 
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,i very strong movement for autonomy, and an equally 
strong demand not, any longer, to be treated as 
second class citizens, but to be admitted to par-
ticipation in the business of the Delegation, and 
to have a voice in issues that affect the life 
and property of the people of Bosnia.* 
In 1910, a constitution was given to Bosnia, with a Diet 
elected on a limited franchise, and subject to the government. 
Administration was still in the control of the Joint Finance I 
hlinister, and directed, in Bosnia, by the Landeschef, or 
Military Governor. 
But little actual reform was made, least of all in the 
direction of a new status within the Empire. The regime of 
General Potiorek, ~filitary 
During the Balkan Wars the 
Governor, was marked by repression. 
Government closed the Diet, and I 
l 
ruled by martial law. It was evident that no real reform 
could be expected from Austria for many years.** 
D. The Jugoslav Problem 
The grov~ng national consciousness, the increasing demand 
for autonomy or independence, and the tendency toward unifi-
cation constituted the problem offered to Austria-Hungary by 
the Jugoslavs within the bounds of the Empire. To a certain 
extent the Jugoslav problem existed in the nineteenth century,, 
I j ~aernreither, 
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but it was to become incre~singly important and complicated 
with the awakening of 1903, the Bosnian Annexation of 1908, 
and finally the Balkan Wars. 
There were three lines of action opened to Austria-
Hungary in the solution of the problem. The Monarchy might 
relinquish control over the sections inhabited almost pure~y 
by Jugoslavs, allowing autonomy and eventually independence. 
The government might so administer the provinces in question 
that a center for the unification of the Jugoslavs would 
develop within the Empire. The third course would be to endea-
vor, in internal policy, to repress Jugoslav nationalism and 
at the same time carry on a foreign policy which would have as 
its aim the weakening and discrediting of Serbia, which might 
become the center of unification. 
Because of the necessity for maintaining the vmning presti 
of the Monarchy, because the Jugoslav provinces provided 
Austria's outlet to the sea, and because Jugoslav independence 
would have intensified the nationality problem elsewhere in 
the Empire, it was unthinkable that the government should 
grant independence to any of the Jugoslav sections. 
The second course would have been to try to create a 
center of unity within the Empire. Would this have been 
possible? On the one hand, the fact that Serbia was indepen~ 
f 1 dent, and grovJing in importance, would tend to make it the 
center of attraction for Jugoslavs everywhere. But on the othe 
hand, for several reasons it was unnatu~nl that Serbia should 
--·--- --··-----··· -·--· --- -- . 
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be the venter of gravity. There were, in Serbia, 2,600,000 
Jugoslavs; in Austria-Hungary 7,300,000. Therefore. from 
sheer weight of numbers the center of unity should be within 
the Monarchy. Secondly, the Jugoslavs of the Empire were 
II 
materially better off than those of Serbia, although, as has 
been noted above, the administration of Bosnia and of Croatia 
had been guilty of many failures to better material conditions 
Finally, cul tu'l".ally, the Serbs were on a lower level than 
the Hapsburg Jugoslavs. who were under the influence of 
Western culture. Particularly was this true of the Roman 
Catholic Croats. Only widespread dissatisfaction can explain 
the fact that the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy fastened their 
hopes upon the backward Serbs. 
Seton-Watson said, in 1911, "Serbo-croat unity outside the 
·Hapsburg Monarchy can only be attained through a universal 
war and a thorough revision of the map of Europe. The achiev-
ment of that unity inside the Hapsburg Monarchy is a far 
more practical policy.~* 
The establishment of a center of unity within the Empire 
had two drawbacks. First, the Croats and Serbs must be 
united; and secondly, if this took place, it meant that a 
change in the organixation of the Hapsburg Monarchy would 
have to be affected. 
The Croats of Croatia-Slavon1a had long desired union 
with D~lmatia. while the Croats of Bosnia were also favorable 
to the idea of union of all the Croats of the Empire. A 
-c.::c::=--.:-.:==-c='=· ===*Croatian st~te_ccould_have been_ organized wj_ thin the Empi~e-'-'-'- ~ -===---=-=cc==== I Seton~iiatson, rllhe Southern Slav Question, 338 
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insure itself against the loss of Croat loyalty. This would 
not entirely solve the problwm since ~t would leave the Serbs 
as a dissatisfied minority. 
A Serbo-Croat state, however, could probably have been 
organized. The Serbo-Croat Coalition demonstrated that the 
two groups could wori together to realize common ambitions. 
The Frank party had as its national ideal the union and 
independence of the Serbo-Croat regions of the Monarchy.*' 
While union of Serbs with Croats might present great difficul 
ties, at least union vvithin the Monarchy, with Croatian 
hegemony, wpuld have been more natural than the acceptance 
by the Croats of leadership by the culturally lower Serbs. 
The significance of the problem was not entirely over-
looked in Austria. Conrad is quoted by Fay** as saying: 
The unification of the South Slav race •••• 
cannot be denied nor artificially prevented. The 
onlyopoint is whether this unification shall take 
place within the control of the Monarchy---that 
is, at the expense of Serbia's independence---
or whether it shall be accomplished under the 
aegis of Serbia at the cost of the Monarchy. 
This cost for us would consist in the loss of 
our South Slav lands and thereby of nearly all 
of our coast. This loss in territory and pres-
1 tige would depress the Monarchy into a Small State. 
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Any union of the Jugoslavs within the Monarchy, it was 
recognized. must of necessity mean the substitution of 
trialism or some form of federalism in the place of Dualism. 
Any departure from the constitutional s1iatuslquo, however, 
would undermine Magyar supremacy, and. the lfJ.agyars strongly 
opposed any tendencies away from Dualism. Thus, Tisza, in the 
crisis of 1914, hesitated to agree to war, and finally consen-
ted after a pledge of no territorial acquisition, not because 
of any moral scruples, but for one reason-- he knew that 
DuBlism and Magyar supremacy could not be maintained if more 
' Jugoslavs were brought into the Empire. 
Francis Ferdinand was geherally believed to be in favor 
of modification of the existing system, probably some form of 
Trialism.* His exact plans are not known, although it was 
common knowledge that he disliked the Magyars and held. them to 
blame for all the evils of the Empire. He was favorable to the 
Croats, perL~.aps because of his religious beliefs. 
The manifesto prepared in anticipation of the day he 
would succeed .l!'ranz Joseph on the Hapsburg throne indicated 
that Franc).~ FE;);J:9,i;nand was not satisfied with the government 
of subject nationalities, and was planning to make some c~ange , 
as the following significant paragraph indicates: 
Since all peoples belonging to our sceptre 
shall have equal rights in regard to participa-
tion in the common affairs of the .Monarchy, this 
*Redlich, 491-492 
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to every race be 
guaranteed its national development within the 
frame of the common interests of the Monarchy, 
and that to all races, ranks, and classes the 
preservation of their just interests be made poss-
i"ble through just laws of suffrage-- wherever 
this has not yet been carried through.* 
No definite plans are stated in the manifesto, hoTiever. 
Jugoslav nationalism could probably have been developed 
within the Monarchy if the government would,without delay, 
offer something upon which Jugoslav political energy could be 
spent. 
Aa Dr. Sachs, Agram advocate and Frank party adherent, in 
1913, said to Baernreither, "We are tho last generation by 
means of which the separation of the entire South Slav world 
from Austria can be prevented." **Austria, however, chose to 
temporize, and refused to overthrow Magyar dominance and set 
in motion a nationality policy which would placate the dissat-
isfied Jugoslavs. Instead0 repressive measures and autocratic 
rule were continued,<:tthEJ Jugoslavs were embittered, and Serbia 
was regar4ad with increasing favor. 
*Manifesto of Francis Ferdinand, N.Y. Nation, 5-26-26, p.588 
** Eaernreither, 203 
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III. AUS~RIA AND THE BALKAN STATES 
.A. General Conditions in the Balkans 
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In the years before the war there were two factors in- i 
I :fluencing Austria's .Balkan policy. The first was the probleml 
offered by Jugoslav nationals within the Empire; the second II 
II j! 
II 
.I 
the opposition to the extension of Russian power in the Bal-
kans and to extraordinary increase in the size of any Balkan 
II 
state. These two factors interplayed to cause an instability!' 
in the relations between Austria and her southern neighbors, 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania. 
ii 
1: 
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The disintegration of the Turkish European Empire had 
been slowly proceeding for a century, and its final dissol- !I 
ution might come at any time. From this dissolution, Russia 1 
I had hoped for a long time to get control of Constantinople. i 
I 
Germany, lacking colonies, hoped to secure colonial advantages 
I in European Turkey. The Balkan states each looked eagerly to / 
i the day when they could liberate their bre~hren who were stil] 
under the intoleraole '2urkish rule. •'inally, .o\ustria, while I 
not hoping to add more ~ugoslavs to her already cumbersome \ 
Empire, could not anticipate with equanimity either hussian 
control of Uonstantinople and the Straits, or sizeable in-
(4 
I I' 
,, 
i' 
i[ 
il 
I• !I I. 
:I 
I 
d 
' :I 
1: 
'I 
2 c: .I 
" ! I 
I' 
. ·-··--::_=-r r :-..=:::.--====~-==:::...::·_ : particularly Serbia. Uonsequantly the maintenance ~f the ,I 
status quo was to Austria's advantage. 
Russia and uermany could not be certain of gaining their 
aims should Turkish rule in ~urope be overthrown, so for the 
present, fearing to shake a plum into the hands of another, 
each power hesitated to disturb the equilibrium. Russia, 
~ I II 
ll 
remembering past failures to secure 0onstan tinople, made it ll 
l) 
her aim for the present to secure the opening of the Straits, II 
while Germany endeavored to secure economic advantages in II 
I 
Turkey. 'fhe jjalkan states, to be sure, were not pledged to ij 
:I the status quo, and indeed, after 1900 each year saw a 
lj 
greater fervor in the aspirations .to free the 'furkish Uhrist-!1. 
. I 
ians. .J)Ut in the end 'rurkey, herself, was to disturb the 1 
I 
delicate Eastern situation, by the Young Turk Revolution, I 
I 
which precipitated the Hosnian Annexation and the Balkan Wars~ 
The conflict of Russia and the Uual Alliance over ~alkan I 
::::::1 s::::t~:s: ::c::~::r t;::~:.::~a::·:r:~::::::::. A In I 
the decade preceding tne war the nationality factor proved I 
strong in predisposing t11e loyalty of the .Balkan· states. 1'hel 
Dual monarchy contained f~S>. important sub j eo t nationalities II 
the Rumanians in Transylvania, under Hungarian rule; the I 
Croatians in Uroatia, under liungarian rule; and the Serbs of I 
Bosnia, under joint administration. We have noted the inept-~ 
itude of the Austro-Rungarian administration in dealing with , 
!I 
the subject nationalities in Croatia and Bosnia, ·wh:lle in· 11 
'I j! ... 
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Transylvania the ad.ministrafion was mucri the- same in nature. 
Wi.thin each of these provinces discontent was common. Sym-
pathy and irredentism tended to make both Serbia and Rumania 
anti-Austrian and consequently pro-Russian. To this was 
added the feeling that Russia was the protector of the small 
Slav states. 
B. Austria and Serbia 
From the time of the re-establishment of the Serbian 
nation, a century before the World War, Austria-Hungary had 
practically surrounded the little country. ~ith no outlet 
to tne sea, Serbia depended on Austria as its market for 
I 
I 
its produce, chiefly cattle and pigs. 
was in a position to exert considerable 
Accordingly, Austria I 
influence over Serbial 
II 
II I; 
I> 
The 0ongress of ~erlin, in which the Monarchy gained 
.Bosnia-Herzegovina, "to occupy and administer", caused deep 
humiliS,tion and bitterness in Serbia. Because Serbia felt 
she had earned the provinces, because their population was 
overwhelmingly Serbian, and because Serbs considered Bosnian 
union as manifest destiny, it was evident that the occupation 
:' would long be resented by Serbia. 
ii 
·: 
., However, Austria and Serbia maintained congenial relations 
I 
almost down to 1908. Milan Obrenovic, 18C9 to 1899, was of , 
pro-Austrian sentiment, and even concluded a secret treaty 
pledging that Serbia would secure Austrian assent to any 
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treaty, and. that no anti-Austrian activity would be [1 
* tolerated. by Serbia. Commercial treaties favorable to 
Austria were also negotiated. by I·lilnn, and. agreeable relations! 
prevailed. until 1903. i 
In this year the Austrophil Alexander, who had succeeded jj 
Milan on the Serbian throne, and. his unpopular ~ueen were 
murdered. ·oy a group of conspire tors from the Serbian army. 
As Alexander was tne last of the Obrenovic's, Peter Kara-
/ georgevio, of the rival dynasty, ascended the throne. He 
immediately began a program aimed. at delivering Serbia from 
Austrian economic tutelage. When munitions contracts, pre-
viously given to the Hohemian Skoda factories, were awarded. 
to Schneider of .!!'ranee, Austria terminated the Serbian com-
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treaty, ana a tariff war was started against Serbia. il 
Between 1903 and 1908 "pig politics" dominated.. Austria , 
mercial 
was the market for Serbian swine, and. to bring ~erbia to 
terms she refused to allow Serbian pigs to cross the border, 
cnarF,ing contamination. For a time this threatened. to wreck 
the main industry of Serbia, and. it caused. great bitterness 
among the peasants. Seruia managed, however, to negotiate 
a treaty with ~urkey, allowint, exportation through Salonica, 
until in 1910 a new treaty with Austria was signed. 
ln the meantime the Annexation had further strained 
Austro-Serbian relations. ln 1~0~ an agreement was reached 
bet'\'Veen the Austrian J!'oreign Minister, Aehrenthal, and. the 
Russian ]1oreign Minister, I svolsky, VJhere by Austria. v;ould 
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treaty, and that no anti-Austrian activity would be ___ ( __________ _ 
* tolerated by Serbia. Commercial treaties favorable to 
Austria were also negotiated by Milnn, and agreeable relationsl
1 
prevailed until 1903. 
·I I~ 
In this year the .Austrophil Alexander, who had succeeded 11 
Milan on the Serbian throne, and his unpopular queen were 
murdered by a group of conspirators from the Serbian army. 
As Alexander was the last of the Obrenovic's, Peter Kara-
/ georgevic, of the rival dynasty, ascended the throne. He 
immediately began a program aimed at delivering Serbia from 
Austrian economic tutelage. When munitions contracts, pre-
viously given to the Hohemian Skoda factories, were awarded 
to Schneider of .ll'rance, .Austria terminated the Serbian com-
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II treaty, and a tariff war vms started against Serbia. ~~ 
Between 1903 and 1908 "pig politics" dominated. .Austria , 
mercial 
I 
I 
I 
was the market for Serbian swine, and to bring ~erbia to 
II 
II 
terms she refused to allow Serbian pigs to cross the border, 
charF,ing contamination. ¥or a time this threatened to wreck 
the main industry of Serbia, and it caused great bitterness 
Seruia managed, however, to negotiate among the peasants. 
a treaty with ~urkey, allowint, exportation through Salonica, 
i_ until in 1910 a new treaty with .Austria was signed. 
ln the meantime the .Annexation had further strained 
Austro-Serbian relations. ln 1~08 an agreement was reached 
bet\'Veen the Austrian .t!'oreign Minister, Aehrenthal, and the 
Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, whereby Austria would 
-.. ~Schmitt, r, 111 
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consent to the opening of the Straits to Russian warships, in li 
II 
In Oct- !I 
I 
return for Russian assent to the Bosnian annexation. 
ober, 1908, following the Young Turk Hevolution, the annex- I 
I 
ation was announced as a fait accompli, while Isvolsky, unablej 
I 
to secure the consent of the other powers to the Straits' I II 
question, charged Aehre n t ha 1 w1 th deceiving him in the sudden ~~ 
announcement of the annexation. 
In Serbia popular opinion was aroused, the army was 
mobiliZed, and demands for compensation were made. Austria 
i. maintained a stern attitude, insisting that Serbia, not being 
!I ,. 
II 
•' 
a signatory of the Treaty of Berlin, had no right to protest 
t.ne annexation. ~ihen .rl.ussi a and England ad vi sed Serbia to 
relinquish her position, she was forced to accept the agree-
ment which Austria demanded of her: 
Serbia recognizes that her rights have not been 
injured by the fait accompli created in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and that she will consequently conform 
to such decision as the Po,.,ers will ta..l\:e regarding 
·· Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Accepting the [; 
advice of the Great Powers, Serbia will immediately 
!I undertake to abandon the attitude of protest and 
I 
\i 
" I. 
opposition whic11 she has followed in regard to the 
I 
II 
I! 
I! 
I! 
II 
II 
annexation since last Autumn, o.ncl sr1e undertakes to 
change the course of her present policy toward Austria-
Ji 
1: Hungary, and live henceforth with the latter as a 
I 
good neighbor. 
Uonforming to these declarations, and confident 
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of the peaceful intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia 
will restore her army to its state in the spring of 
1908, as far as concerns its organization, location, 
and effectives, and she will disarm and disband her 
irregular units~ on her territory. ** 
Theoretically the crisis was ended. But actually a 
great amount of bitterness remained in Serbia, and Austria 
could hardly expect that such. an agreement, forced upon Serbia~ 
would be faithfully adhered to. 1'he chief result was to drive!l 
the resentment and protest underground. 
In 1909, however, hlilovanovi c(, Serbian Foreign Minister, 
made overtures to Austria regarding a rapprochement. The 
conditions would be a change in trade relations, .Austrian 
sanction of transportation of munitions into Seroia, and, 
finally, Austrian recognition of Serbian claims in Macedonia • 
.Aehrenthal paid no attention to the proposal, and nothing 
came of it. 
Another attempt to make an agreement with .Austria v1as 
r 
made in 1911, when Passic, through Professor Masaryk, asked 
i 
:1 for a conference with Berchtold regarding improvement of 
it 
:: .Austro-Serbian relations. Berchtold, however, refused to see 
]i Pas sic(, and diploma tic bitterness was added to the general 
ill will in Serbia.*** 
*. The comitadjis 
!:*British Documents, V, 747 
Baernreitner, 146-147 
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c. The Balkan Wars 
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After long years of drenms of liberating their brethren 11 
·who chafed under Turkish rule, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Montenegro, stung by atrocities in Macedonia, in 1912 joined 
together in a war against the Turk. In a few weeks Turkey 
was defeated, driven back almost to Constantinople, and the 
!I II 
ll 
l! 
II 
II !i 
Turki sn power in Europe broken. !1 
In planning tne war the ~alkan states had agreed upon the !I 
I 
method of dividing tne spoils. Serbia would get an Albanian i 
I 
I 
I 
corridor and harbor as its plum. ~ulgaria would have the 
i larger part of Macedonia. However, the treaty of London, 1913~ 
at Austria's behest, vetoed Serbia 1 s outlet to the sea, since II 
that would greatly increase the power and economic independencJ 
'I 
of Serbia, which was by this time considered to be a menace to j 
., the Empire. 
I Serbia was forced to acquiesce, but in return demanded 
from bulgaria recompense in the form of part of Macedonia. I. II 
I 
Bulgaria, elated by her victor;<l over t~"e Turks, turned on her '1 
ij [; 
11 
former allies, and in June, 1913, the Second Balkan Vlar began. 11 
)j Bulgaria in this war was facing not only Serbia, Montenegro !1 
'I I 
i! and Greece, out also Turkey and Rumania. She was defeated and j' li 
,, 1 
" I! forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Bucharest in August, , 
'I I 
I 1~13. I 
By this treaty 1urkey recovered ~drianople, and Rumania 
• 
.. 
1: 
!l 
i 
I ,, 
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I 
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and Greece gained terri tory. Chiefly, hov.rever, the gains v~~~t]\ --- ---
to Serbia, which emerged from the v.rar almost doubled in size. 11 
As far as Turkish lands viere concerned, the dreams of Serbian i\ II 
II 
\/ irredentists were fulfilled. Union of the Macedonian Serbs, 'I 
especial concern of the army radicals, was a reality. The 
only irr~denta no~ remained vrithin the lands of the Ha~sburg 
Monarchy.* 
D. Austria and Rumania 
The outcome of the second Balkan Viar was with good 
_, 
,, 
!I 
! reason unsatisfactor~r to .Austr1a. Serbia had gained a tre- :I I, 
:· 
,, 
I 
mendous increase in territory, if not her lon~ed-for seaport. I 
Furthermore, Rumania, .Austria's ally in the Balkans, had 
joined with Serbia, her enemy, and tnis gave added strength 
to the belief that ~ustria's Balkan policy, based upon her 
Rumanian alliance, v.ould have to iJe modified. 
Rumania had since 1B7r/, wnen Russia had taken a strip of 
her territory, been friendly vdtn Austria-Hungary. In 1883 
the two nations concluded a secret treaty, which pledged that 
neither would enter an alliance directed against the other, 
and also provided for joint military action in the event that 
eitner power should be attacked. The treaty was renewed in 
1892, 1896, 1903, and finally in 1913. 
~ Schmitt, I, 131-143; Fay, I, 438-447 
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This treaty vms the central feature of the lmstrian 
Balkan policy, since it not ohly maintained a balance of 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I po·wer in the Balkans, out it was of grea. t strategic . importance rl 
,, 
in that in the event of a war with Russia, Rumania could be :! 
i.l depended upon to prevent a flank attack and hold a large part 
of Russia's forces in check. 
After 1900, however, Rumanian popular opinion began to 
turn against Austria, chiefly becnuse of the growing sympathy 
for the three million Rumanians under Magyar rule in Transyl-
vania. After the first Balkan \Var Rumania was disturbed oy 
the large gains made oy Dulgaria, but she received no encour-
agement from Austria in her demands for territorial compen-
sation. \1hen in the second Balkan liar Russia allov1ed Rumania 
to JOin tn the war against Bulgaria, Eumanian opinion became 
II 
11 
i 
i 
l! more favorable to Russia. 
li In the meantime, although the treaty had heen renewed, 
1 
:: Austria v1as beginning to question the value of the alliance. j
1 
r! 
1
.
1
:,: In spite of King Carol's personal loyalty, Czernin and others 1
11
_1 
reported that Rumania's friendship could not be relied upon.~ 
i 
The effectiveness of the alliance eventually came to be con-
tained in the person of King 6arol, and he himself reluctantly 
admitted that Rumanla could not be connted upon for military 
support.** 
From Austria's point of view her influence in the Bnlknne I 
* 
** 
Czernin, 87-92 
Kautsky Documents, 73-74 
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depended upon either a strengthening of the Rumanian alliance ff 
!i 
'I 
t' 
or the establishment of a new alLcrnment, in which .l)ulgaria 
:i 
i, should ~e the pillar of her Balkan policy. :ro this end, a 
ii ,, 
II li ,, 
i: 
11 1! I! 
:: memorandum outlining the proposed changes in Balkan policy was :1 
,, 
II li 
II.· 
il I 
drawn up by tne Ballplatz and presented to Germany for approv-1 
I ii ,, 
!i 
ii The inadequacy of the Rumanian alliance was demonstrated; (! 
Austria vw.s bound to its terms, yet she cou!ld hardl;>~ hope for ;> 
If !I \: II I' Rumanian protection from Russia--in fact, Rumania would, if · 
li i 
11 anything, join in any agressi on. Austria represented that the II. 
I ~ 
! remedy would be found in acceptine· the Eulgnri an overtures for 1 
1
: an alltiiance, and at the same time securing an alliance of I 
T ! Turkey wit~ Bulgaria. 
I 
An Austro-Bulgarian rapprochement would not only insure ji 
Austria against Balknn isolation, but could be used to warn 
I 
Rumania that Austria \IOUld not be satisfied vJi th an unfriendly il 
!1 
:I 
alliance. J1s another argument in favor of this new policy, ;j 
Rumania had become reconcile a. with .Austria's recoc-cni~ed enemy, :! 
;! ,, 
Serbia, v~hile Bulgaria was bitter because o:f: her defeat at the ! 
hands of Serbia. :I 
Austria's plans for a modification of her Balkan diplo-
macy had hardly been crystalli~ed I when the assassination took' 
·' place. The memorandum to Germany, draVJn up in June, v1as 
delivered on July 4, 1~14.* 
*Kautsky Documents, 70-71 
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IV. JUGOSLAV ANTI-AUSTRIAN ACTIVITIES 
A. Introduction 
rj 
In deciding the nature of the affront suffered by .Austria !l 
l! 
in the murder of the Archduke, it vnll be necessary to study 
two phases of the question. First, did Serbia lmowingly . 
permit, perhaps even encourage, revolutionary propaganda and 
activities, directed against Austria, which would inevitably 
aggravate her nationality problem? Second, the crime was 
1 perpetrated on Austrian soil, by Bosnians, but it originated 
in Serbia. Has it instigated and aided uy Serbians? Were 
1' responsible officials in the Serbian government aware of the 
II 
I 
:I 
I• 
I' 
II 
fl li I! 
.I 
il 
plans for tne attenta·t, and if so, did they attempt to frustrat'e 
I, 
I' it? 
,I Finally, v•as the attentat .. the inevitable culmination of 
ii 
)i 
i! 
(: 
Serbian subversive propaganda? 
Had .Austria adopted a far-seeing nationality policy, the 
il Jugoslav problem could have oeen settled within the Monarchy, 
I 
i 
and she would have oeen immune to danger from revolutionary 
~' activity instigated from Serbia. But Austria acted stupidly, 
,. 
' and her nationality policy was such that a certain amount of 
• subversive activity would undoubtedly develop in Bosnia and 
;i 
other discontented sections. This, however, in no way excul-
pates Serbia if she permitted vii thin her borders a pro::r,ram of 
li 
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'! revolutionary activity aimed at weakening the Monarchy and 
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'I 
:I 
"immediately under- il 
il 
I eventually uniting Bosnia with Serbia. 
1: Serbia had, in 1909, ,pledged herself to 
I 
take to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which jl 
I ,I 
i! she has followed i.b,;~egard to the annexation ••• and live hence-
1
j 
t! 
li 
I' 
forth with the latter as a good neighbor." * 
i on .• July 23, 1914, in the fateful Ultimatum, Austria 
i 
! charged that "a subversive movement with the object of detach-\ 
ing a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the jJ 
Monarchy ••• had its birth under the eye of the S b . ,I er 1an govern- 1 
I 
ment," and that "far from carrying out the formal undertakings! 
i 
contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the 
Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to repress this 
,, 
i 
i movement. It has tolernted the criminal activity of various 
societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the 
licentious language of the press, the glorification of the 
authors of outrages, nnd the participation of officers and 
It 
;) 
functionaries in subversive agi to tion ••• in short, it has per- 1 : 
': 
" :, mi tted manifestations of a nature to incite the Serbian pop- i: ,, 
I' ,\ 
ula tion to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its insti tu- i! 
il 
tions." ** !I 
[; 
<~as the agreement of 1909 entered into with sincerity on ij 
! the part of Serbin? 
I 
·~vere Austria •s charges of failure to 
I 
! live up to this agreement juStified? 
* See above ,p. 28-29 
** Austrian Red Book, 6 
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D. Narodna Odbrana 
1. Origin and Membership 
Foremost amon8 the agencies sponsoring anti-£ustrian 
agitation in Serbia and within the annexed provinces was 
Harodna Odbrana l Hational Defense). On October 5, 1908, 
36 
Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
1i That evening Dr. Milo van Milovanovic, Serbian Minister of 
:i 
:I !i II 
il 11 
Foreign .Affairs, called a meeting o:t prominent officials and J 
II 
leaders to discuss this act, so important to all loyal SerbianJl. 
Included were Premier Passic, the Mayor of Belgrade, Minister !' 
of Education Ljuba Jovanovic, ana. others. It was decided that I 
:: the following day the Mayor should organize a meeting of promiJj 
,: nent citizens, to decide upon the form of protest which should I 
11 be made. 
At the suggestion of the Serbian dramatist, Branislav 
Nussic, t"'is second gatherinp: organized a society, Narodna 
Odbrana, which pledged itself to protect and advance Serbian 
interests in the annexed provinces. .A central committee was ,, 
organized, di ;-:,trict committees for each province and local 
committees were soon set up, and work was begun on the task 
I' enrolling thousands of memuer s and training tnem for the 
great objective. 
i1 Members inuluded government leaders, like Passi c and 
Ljuba Jovanovic; army mem with revolutionary ideals, like 
I' 
ii Colonel Dragutin Dimi trijevic and Mnjor Voya Tankosic; govern-
'I 
I 
I' ,, 
I 
I 
il 
I 
,, 
i 
1: 
:' 
men t employees like ~i vo jin llaCi C, di rector of the government ~I 
printing office; professors and school teachers, and a large il 
'I 
number of less resp(J)nsi ble individuals, many playing with !I 
revolutionary ideas, who were to become the frontier officers,~ 
I 
I 
il I' 
.I 
confidential men, and comi tadjis--such men as Gacinovic and 
Vaso Cubrilovic. * 
2. Objectives of Narodna Odbrana I 
I 
.As a result of the .Austrian Ultimatum of March 31, 1909, li 
I' d 
i' 
and ostensibly Narodna Odbrana became a cultural and athletic 1/ 
organization, similar to the Slovak sokols. Actually, however~ 
the ~~erbian goveTnment withdrew its support of the society, 
i\ 
the aims of the society Viere much the same as at its founding./! 
The .Austrian dossier, Enclosure 2, prints extracts from II 
"Harodna Odorann", officinl organ of the society, published II 
by its Central Oownittee in 1911. This pamphlet outlines the j 
program of the ao~iety and gives n repott of its activities. ! 
Chapter 1 is entitled "Genesis and Activity of the first I 
i 
Narod.na Odbrana", and gives, as the original objectives: 
(1) To arouse, encourage, and strengthen national 
sentiment. (2~ To enroll and recruit volunteers. {3) 
To form voluhteer-units and prepare them for armed 
action. (4) To collect voluntary contributions in 
* Schmitt,!, 179-180; Fay, II, 80 
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money ana supplies for the realization of the task. 
{5) To organize, equip, ana drill special irre~1lar 
troops for special, independent warfare. (6) To 
institute movements in all other ways for the defense 
of the Serbian people. 
The dossier q_uotes from Chapter 2, "The New Narodna 
Odbrana of To-day", the follo~ing passage: 
The struggle which Servia has to assume is more 
serious and difficult than was thought •••• In 
order that a new surprise attack may not find Servia 
in an equally unprepared state, it is necessary to 
prepare ourselves for work. 
The aim of the lecture program is q_uoted from Chapter 
VII, of the pamphlet: 
The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were 
more or less lectures of agitation. The program of 
our new work was developed. At every lecture the annex-
ation was spoken about, the old Narodna Odbrana and 
the tasks of the new. The lectures will never cease 
to be lectures o~ agitation; but they will always 
develop more and more into individual channels and 
concern themselves with every question of our 
social and national life. 
Chapter XII stated that 
among the main problems of it is that of maintain-
ing the union with our near and distant brothers 
I! 
il 
'I 
I 
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beyond the border--- By the word'people' is meant 
our entire race, not only in Servia. 
The attitude toward Austria is explained in Chapter XII: 
Inasmuch as we take the ground that through the 
annexation of Bosnia and HerzegoVina, the encroach-
ment upon our territories from the north has been 
fully revealed, the Narodna Odbrana regards Austria-
Hungary as our greatest enemy •••• As once upon a 
time the Turks poured in upon us from the south, 
so Austria-Hungary today is attacking us from the 
north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necess-
ity of a war against Austria-Hungary, it is preach-
ing the holy truth of our national situation. 
In the concluding chapter the ~ork of the society is 
summed iip: 
Since the Nnrodna Odbrana v1orks in accordance 
v1ith the spirit of the time and in conformity with 
the altered circumstances, maintaining at the same 
time all connections that were formed at the time 
of the annexation, it is the same today as it was 
then •••• Today, too, it rallies to its banners the 
citizens of Serbia as it did at the time of the 
annexation. At that time the cry was for war; today 
the cry is for work; at that time meetings, demon-
strations, volunteer committees, rifles, and bombs 
were called fdr; today silent, fanatical, indefatigable 
I 
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'I 
work is required, and more work in the direction 
of the tasks and duties which we have indicated, 
as temporary preparation for the battle with 
--:=-~-==-jr=~-==c=-=---
1 
rifle and camnon that will come. 
The pamphlet, according to its preface, "does not 
represent a complete, eXhaustive analysts of the total 
work of the Narodna Odbrana, as for many reasons it neither 
should or could do that". Yet, it is very evident that the 
chief purpose of the NErodna Odbrana, both before and after 
the 1909 Ultimatum, ~as to prepare Serbia for the war with 
Austria '1:''1hich 'lrJas considered inevitable, and that all Serbs, 
including those beyond the borders, were taught that Austria 
wns the "new Turkey".* 
3 • .Activities of Uarodna Odbrana 
Narodna Odbrana enrolled comitadjis, and under army men 
/ like Tankosic they were trained in bomb throwing and pistol 
shooting. National literature and anti-Austrian propaganda 
was distributed, and lecturers sent out, not only within 
Serbia, but in Bosnia as well. For the purpose of smuggling 
literature and agents of the society into the provinces 
confidential men were established in Hosnia, and an "under-
ground tunnel" instituted • 
Students, particularly Bosnian emigres, were aided 
~Quoted from Austrian Red Book, 34-39 
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financially. In 1914, for instance, -... • I vasJ.c, secretary of 
lhrodna Odbrana, gave to tlabrinovic 20 dinars, HB.rodna prop-
aganda, and v1ri tings of Russian revolutionaries • .;. .Austria, 
during the war captured lists of students subsidized by 
Narodna Odbrnna, which included Zherajio, Gacinovic, and 
Vaso Cubrilovic, who assisted in smuggling the assassins into 
Bosnia .... * 
Finally there was undertaken an extensive program of 
cultural and physical advancement of all Serbs, combined with <~ 
an emphasis of the idea of the unity of the Jugoslavs. This 
I. 
was carried out not only by Narodna Odbrana itself, but by 
societies under its influence.*** This cultural program came 
to be the most important vJOrk of the society after the annex-
~tion crisis passed. 
c. Ujidinjenje ili Smrt 
1. Origin 
A second organization, much more ruthless in its char-
il 
!i 1: 
I ,, 
il 
li 
acter, was Ujidinjenje ili Smrt Union or Death , often known ( ) I'  
11 ;1 :1 '] 
:1 as the "Black Hand". Even to-day the importance of the society; 
1: cannot be definitely determined, but in 1914 practically ~~ 
I 
nothing was known of it--it was mentioned. but once )I 
"Mousset, '10-'1); 
**M. Edith Dur:i1am, "Fresh Light on Serbin and the War", in ;; 
Contemporary Revie-r;, CXXXIV, 303, Sept. 1928 :
1 
+**.Austrian Red Book, 39 li 
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!l in the Austrian dossier. One reason for this lack of know- !1 
.I !i jl 
ledge was that Ujidinjenje ili Srnrt was a secret society. li 
I! 
:i But more lmportant was the fact that practically all its :i 
i :: 
1' \1 
:· members vJere memoer s also of .Narc dna Odbrana, and much of its i: 
1: acti vi tt'~was credited to the less revolutionary organ:i zati on.* i 
I 
' I 
11 Ujidinjenje ili Smrt was founded in May, 1911, b3t o. I )! :! 
' ~ i 
! group of army officers, many of whom had taken part in the 
1
i 
'
1 II 
conspiracy which had assassinated .Alexander in 1903, who I! 
were dissatisfied because the government was abandoning its 
propaganda in Macedonia. Chedo Popovic, one of the founders 
of the society, has written an account of its founding'~<: 
summarized by Schmitt as follows: 
The lead vms taken by Bogdan Radenkovic, who had been 
one of the most prominent workers in Macedonia. Failing 
to receive any official encouragement, he approached 
three men with his idea: Voya Tankosic, alteady well 
known as a Comi tadji, Ljuba Jovanovic-C:tmpa, a univer-
si ty man with revolu tionar;y lead ings ••• and Velimir 
., 
I· II 
i· 
Vemic, then a captain of cavalry. All agreed to join 
with hl:m in forming a revolutionary society, and to 
invite the co-operation of .Major Dragutin Dimitrijevic, 
Major Iliya Radivojevi&, and Captain Chedo Popovi6. ' ,, 
~hese seven men founded the organization and signed 
the statutes, which were drawn up by Radenkovic, 
Schmitt, 1, 202-204 
**c.A.Popovic, "Organizacija 'Ujedinjenje ili Smrt 11 in 
' Evropa", XV, 396-400, June summarised by 
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Jovanovic, and Tankosic •.•• Dimitrijevic declared that 
"he would not be able to give much time to the work 
since he was extremely occupied with official and 
other business." A little later three more persons 
were added: lliya Jovanovic-Pchinyski, an artillery 
officer, Major Milan Vasi6, who later became secretary 
of Narodna Odbrana, and Lieut-Colonellviilan G. lvlilanovic. 
These ten men constituted the Central Committee of the 
Society; their names are signed to the Constitution. + 
2. Hature of the Society 
The statutes of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt give a good indi-
cation of the nature of the society. Its object (Art. 1) 
was to be the union of all Serbs. All Serbs anywhere may 
I join. Terrorist action was preferred to intellectual 
activity. (Article 2) To accomplish its aim of union, Serbial I' I! 
was to be regarded as the Piedmont, and the society was to be 
friendly with all states and peoples friendly to Serbia. But 
revolutionary action was to be organized in all territories 
1 inhabited by Serbs, and outside Serbia those opposing union i! 
I 
I 
I. were to be attacked in every possible vmy. (.Art. 4). !I 
H 
The organization was to be governed by a Central Committee 
!, 
.. , at belgrade {Art. 5} which should include delegates from 
I; Serbia and one delegate from each Serbian terri tory outside 
•schmitt I 189-190 t t 
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. . . . . 
. ··-~-~~r ------
~ 
44 j_ 
the kingdom (Art.7). Vii thin Serbia the instructions of the 
organization should be carried out by the Central Committee 
alone (Art. 8). Outside Serbia the local committees should 
•, be supreme for their territories (Art.9}, with the stipulation 
that extensive revolutionary activities must be approved by 
the Central Committee (Art .19) which v.as to keep in touch with 
the territorial committees by means of delegates (Art.lB). 
l 
I-
I 
II 
Article 16 is particularly notable: 
In exceptionally urgent cases, as well as in cases 
of less importance, the president and secretary may 
come to a decision ana undertake its execution and 
report their action to the Central Uommittee at its 
next meeting. 
Except within the L:entral Uommi ttee, members were not 
known to each other. U1rt. 26). Members were bound to absolute 
obedience to the committees (Art.27). Each member was bound 
to communicate to the Central Committee at Belgrade anything 
he might learn, as private individual or state official, con-
cerning matters of interest to anyone (Art.28). A member was 
to place the interests of the organization above all others 
(Art.29); in joining he loses his own personality, and can 
expect neither glory nor personal profit. If by any act he 
injured the org~nization, death might be the penalty (Art.30). 
Vfuen the Central llommittee at Belgrade has pronounced 
penalty of death, the only matter of importance is that 
the execution take place without fail. The method 
l 
II 
-• 
I 
I 
' 
employed is a matter of indifference." (Art.33) * 
3. Members 
Army officers dominated Ujidinjenje ili Smrt, but the 
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membership was by no means confined to military circles, and !I 
in spite of the fact that later there vms opposition by the 'I 
!I 
I 
Radical Party to Ujidinjenje ili Smrt, there were not a few 
civil officials on the rolls. 
Dr. Bogicevic gives a list of the founders and members 
of the Supreme Central Uo~~ittee, as follows: 
No. 1. Ilya Radivojevic, infantry colonel and head of 
the ~elgrade gendarmie. 
l~o. 2. Bogdan Radenkovic, v.tl.ce consul at Salonica, 
after·wards Secretary of the .Athens legntion. He \'Jas one of 
the principal authors of the stat.utes, and, according to 
I Bogicevic, was liaison agent between the organization and the i! 
'I Ministry of ]1oreign .Affairs. He was one of the members 
condemned at the Salonica ~rial, and died in prison. 
r~o. 3. T. Popovic, infantry colonel, also sentenced at 
Salonicn. 
il 
il 
I 
II 
'I 
!J 
! 
No. 4. v. Vemi6, cavalry colonel, sentenced at Salonica.: 
Ho. 5. Ljuba s . .Jovanovic, one of the authors of the \1 
statutes, and director of Piemont, the newspaper of the \J 
I' 
organization. II 
:I 
.,.iii. Bogicevic, "The Society, 'Union or Death', called the 
'Black J:iand'" KSF IV 682-689 
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No. 6. Dragutin Dimitrijevic, head of the intelligence 
Department of the Serbian General Staff. Dimitrijevic, a born 
conspirator, may be said to symbolize the society, and appar- i; 
ently he soon came to dominate its activities. 
No. 7. Voya Tankosic, infantry commandant, who became 
a comitadji instructor and leader, and also instructed and 
armed revolutionaries attempting attentats. 
No. 8. llya M. Jovanovic, in fan try coinnlllndant. 
No. 9. Milan Vasic, infantry commandant, and later 
il 
!I 
secretary of Haro dna Odbrana. .tie probably was responsible for 'I 
lj 
such connection as existed between the two societies. At d 
:I li the Salonica Trial Dimi trejevic testified that Vasic vms Ji 
I[ made a member of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt because it was expected II 
I• that in this way the 'llotk of !larodna Odbrnna would be in- I 
1/ fluenced. * It will be noted that Vasic as Narodna Odbrnna 
I 
I 
I 
secretary gave to dabrinovic propaganda and money. ~* 
No. 10. Milan lVlilanovic, Colonel on the General Staff. 
On the general membership list of the society Bogicevic 
includes the folloviing: 
No. 111. Bojin Simic, infantry officer, and instructor 
a school for comitadjis. 
No. 166. Duchan Optrikic, artillery commandant, and 
intimate friend of Ljuba Jovanovic, Minister of Education. 
No. 2.1'1. Vladimir Gacinovic', agent for either or both 
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and Ujidinjenje in Bosnia, and author of "Death of 
a Hero". 
No. 406. Dr. Milan Gavrilovic, Secretary a~ the Ministry I 
of Foreign Affairs and later editor of the ~elgrade ":Poli tika". 
No.401. M. A. Jovanovic, Secretary of the Railway 
Department. 
No. 407. Bogoljub Vuoicevic, Commissioner of Police. 
No. 412. Milan Ciganovic, a subordinate official in the 
Serbian Sate Railways, and one of the Sarajevo conspirators. 
It is also possible that he was an agent of Premier Passic.* 
No. 442. Michel Givcovi6, Secretary of the Serbiam Court 
of Cassation. 
No. 471. Dr. Novakovi~, Secretary of the University of 
Belgrade. 
No. 467. Stanoje Simic, Employee at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
M. Jovanovic, nephew of :Passic, Secretary in the 
Ministry of .ll'oreign Affairs, and Charge d 1Affaires at .Berlin, 
in 1914; Princip, Ilic, and Mohamed Mehmedbachic are also 
listed by Bogioevic as members, although their numbers are 
not given. *,..: 
The membership obviously contained many who v;ere connect 
ed with the government. Crown Prince Alexander was even favorj 
able to the society at its founding, and according to 
I *Schmitt, 1, 218 
_ L_ *_* Bogicevic, _J{Sl!\ IV, _6_[37-§~'3 ________ _ 
--1i. 
I 
., 
Piemont, Possibly he evan would have become a member if it 
would not have necessitated that he head the organization. 
4. Activities 
It has been shown that the government was represented 
on the membership roll of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt at its organi-
zation, and it is generally believed that at first the govern-
ment was on good terms with the secret society. At the 
Salonica Trial Deimitriievic testified that in 1911 he had 
. J d 
informed M. l\lilovanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the 
society, and that the minister had replied, '~y young friend, 
put your 1Black Handf at my disposal and you will see what 
,... 
Milovanovic will, in a short time, do for Serbdom".** 
In 1911 the General Staff decided to establish frontier 
officers on the borders of Macedonia and Bosnia. Either 
because of this understanding, or as Popovic implies, because 
of the fact that ~mitrijevic and other Central Committee 
members were on the Central Staff, the frontier officers 
selected ~ere members of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt. 
Along the Turkish frontier, the frontier officers made 
plans for the impending struggle, while in and around Serbia 
Tankosic and other members organized and trained comitadji 
! * Bogicevic, 6 71:3 
,I ~* Ibid t KS]'' IV J 
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bands. The society aided the Serbian cause during the wars, 
and during the second war vms responsible for many acts of 
terrorism against Bulgarian elements.* 
Along the Bosnian frontier, frontier officers were sta-
tioned at Shabats, Loznitsa, and Uzhitse, and apparently it 
was expected that Bosnia \!OUld be won in much the same manner 
as Macedonia. The frontier officers, according to Popovic, 
took up the work where Nar~dna Odbrana left it, after the 
passing of the annexation crisis. 
The Bosnian frontier officers reneved the contacts made 
previously by Uarodna, and by 1914 an nundergroung railway" 
was functioning quite smoothly, bearing into Bosnia Serbian 
propaganda and agents of the society. Serbian societies within 
Bosnia were encouraged, and apparently had a great growth 
between the years 1911 and 1914. 
In all this activity in Bosnia, Ujidinjenje ili Smrt 
worked secretly, carrying on its vwrk under the guise of the 
Narodna Odbrana. This explains why Ujidinjenje ili Smrt was 
hardly mentioned by the ..tiUStrian government in the Ultimatum 
or the dossier, at the prial, or at the Banualuka trial in 
1915-16 when 123 Bosnians v;ere charged vJi th treason "because, 
with the intention of forcibly changing the position and form 
of the ••• provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina •••• and of 
joining(them) to the kingdom of Serbia, in the course of the 
*carnegie Report, 158-186 
I 
.i 
-~.··.-7·.'\l.. 
- .. .., 
-ij#MbiijfW?Hi1¥¥rkw"~#hie%·4Wrre~w,:farw·:eaweMintwmii'"~l a;a ____ _..1,1h,il!ilillii'MIIiil'""'. Wiii·JlM'I-*=-"na..-.... v ..... rs-....-----.. ---
.. , 
I 
·-- t-~---- ========~=========5=0===H·'~=~~~~--. ~----------•+·-
• 
• 
years 1911-1914 they joined the Serbian revolutionary society 
Narod.na Odbrana".* 
c. The Serbian ~ress 
The Austrian Government, in the Ultimatum, charges the 
Serbian press with being hostile to .Austria and publishing 
.I inflammatory articles. rrhe dossier quotes a number of partic-
11 ularly caustic articles gathered from Serbian papers during 
the years 1910 to 1914. The articles fall into three classes: 
those referring to .Austria with hatred and reminding Serbians 
of themr complaints against Austria, especially in regard to 
the annexation; those severely condemning tendencies by the 
goverrunent toward any rapprochment; and those in praise of 
criminal acts against .Austria. 
On the second anniversary of the annexation the follow-
ing comments occured in Belgrade papers:"Europe must take 
note that the Serbian people still thirst for revenge." "The 
day of revenge must arrive; the feverish efforts of Serbia 
to organize her army are a token of the accounting to come, a 
is the hatred of the Serbian people for the neighboring 
Monarchy.n 
)jCSchmitt, I, 206. Except ns otherwise noted, this section is 
based upon Schmitt, I, 197-206, v1hich summarizes C. A. 
Popovic, "The Work of the •union or Death' Organization": 
Frontier Officers, in nova Evropa, XVI, 139-152. 
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.Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dismembered 
the Turkish Empire: we shall likewise render .Austria asunder • 
We have ended one war; now we are facing another." 
When, in .April, 1911, Kil"(tg Peter planned to visit the 
Emperor, many Serbian papers mnde bitter comments, such as 
that of the "Mali Journal", that the visit v:ould be "an insult, 
to all Serbia. Through this visit Serbia would lose her claim 
to Piedmont's part. Serbia's interests can never be identifie 
with Austria's interests." 
The Folitika, on the Emperor's eightieth birthday, 
published a large picture of Zerajic, glorifying him for his 
attempted assassination ana boasting that "from his blood a 
thousand more brave hands will rise." 
On the Jucic attempt to assassinate Cuvaj, Pravda said: 
"It must hurt the soul to its depths that not everybody has 
:1( v / 
acted as our Juuic did. We have Jucic no more, but Vie have 
hatred and anger; we have today ten millions of Ju~id." * 
Piemont, in 1912, published anonymously the pamphlet of 
Gacinovic's glorifying Zherajic, which had such an influence 
on young radicals. ** 
It is quite evident that the Serbian press considered 
.Austria as Serbia's enemw;- and even ·went so far as to condone 1 
acts of violence against Austrian authorities. The Serbian 
* Quotations from the dossier, .Austrian Red Book, 30-34 
**See belo·w, p. 53 
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' I Government, to be sure, took the position that it could in no 1 
way censor or punish the press-- a position hardly tenable in 
view of the violence of the attacks and the fact that austria 
and Serbia were, at leat nominally, on peaceful terms. 
D. Attentats Preceding Sarajevo 
1. The Zherajic ''Martyrdom" 
In connection with the guilt of Serbia for the Sarajevo 
attentat, it will be enlightening to study the details of 
previous attempts made against Austrian authorities, noting 
particularly vJhether the terrorists who made these attempts 
were incited e~ther by Serbs or by Serbian agencies, and whet~~ 
er they received any aid, in the way of weapons or instructiod , 
from Serbian sources. 
The first notable attempt at terrorism was made at the 
opening of the Bosnian Diet in June, 1910, when a young 
Serb,from Herzegovina,Bogdan Zherajic, fired five shots at the 
military governor of the province, General Varashanin, and 
then with the sixth bullet killed himself. Zherajic had spent 
a year in Belgrade, where he had been trained in revolver 
practise by Bojin Simic, later a member of Ujidinjenje ili 
Smrt.* 
Zherajic's deed was important as an indication, but 
*Fay, II, 96; KSF, IV, 24, 675, 688 
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The action of the authorities--tho governor was reported to 
have kicked the corpse, and Zhera31c was buried in a nameless 
grave in a cemetery for criminals--won him many sympathizers, 
and he was acclaimed as a martyr. 
Mention has been made of the article in Politika, 
published two months later, Vii th a picture of Z:herajic. But 
a still more impor tnnt glorification was the pamphlet, "The 
Death of a Hero", published in Belgrade in 1912 by Vladimir 
Gacinovic. Gacinovic was the son of n Herzegovinian priest, 
but lived in .Oele;rade from 1909 to 1912, vvhere he came under 
the influence oi: Serbian nationalists, and joined the .Narodna 
Odbrana.. After Ujidinjenje ili Smrt ~as founded he joined 
as numoer 217. He then returned to bosnia to organize 
revolutionary g'roups, kruzhoki, such as that VJhich he started 
with Danilo Ilic as center. 
Gacinovic's pamphlet praised those who were laying the 
foundations for the shining national life to come. He 
commended the Russian terrorists, but particularly Zherajic, 
who was held up as an ideal for Serbian youth to emulate, and 
he passed on to them the challenge of Zherajic's appeal, 
"I leave it to Serbdom to avenge me."* 
The pamphlet greatly influenced many young Serbian 
nationals. Cabrinovic reports that it influenced him to 
----~-------------· -··--·~------------
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II terrorist action, together with an article in the Prague 
:: Zora, which criticized a Serbian professor for committing 
suicide, on the ground that. he should have taken with him to 
death at least one enemy of Serbia.*' 
Princip at his trial said of Zherajic, "He was my first 
model. Since I was seventeen years old I often spent whole 
nights near his grave. I reflected on our miserable condition 
and I meditated on him. It was then that I decided on the 
attentat. I swore at his grave sooner or later to commit an 
attentat.** Princip also smd that when he arrived at Sara-
jevo he visited the grave and put Zherajic's name on his 
tomb. 
3. v / The Jucic Attempt 
On June 8, 1912, Luka Jucic shot at Baron Cuvaj, Croatian 
ban, missed him, but killed his secretary, Councillor von 
Hervojic, and wounded a gendarme. According to the charges 
in the Austrian dossier, Ju~ic was a' :memuer of a pilgrimage ofl 
students from .A.gram to .tlelgrade on April 18, 1912, and during 
the celebrations in honor of the visitors was influenced by 
Serbian nationalism. Later, it was charged, a Serbian major 
jl handed him a bomb, apparently from a Serbian arsenal, and 
another sympathizer gave nim a ~rowning pistol. *** 
*11ousset, 109-110 
**:Mousset, 151 
***Austrian Red Book, 26_____ _ _____________________ _ 
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gives a somewhat different story, adding that at the visit of 
the students the Crown Prince Alexander received Jucic in 
private audience, about which he refused to say nnything at 
his trial.* 
Miss Durham quotes Oskar Tartaglia, Black Hand member, 
who told in an article in Nova Evropa, how the attack on Cuvaj 
was planned: "In Belgrade I introduced him to Dimitrijevic 
Apis, who at once agreed to an attentat on Cuvaj, and without 
more consideration, handed him to Tankosic, who taught him 
revolver shooting and bomb throwing." Miss Durham also says 
that the Austrian police traced Jucic$visits to Belgrade, and 
found many of the Serbian arsenal bombs in the Save."'* 
3. Dojcio and Shafer Attempts 
Ivan Dojcic, a Croat emigrant, came all the way from 
America, and on August 18, 1913, attempted to assassinate the 
new ban. Baron Skerlecz. Few facts are known regarding this 
attempt. The dossier assumes it to be the result of "the 
'foreign' agitation carried on by the Narodna Odbrana and its 
confederates among the Southern Slavs of .America,n and gives 
as an instance of this agitation a pamphlet published in 
America urging Serbs to return to Serbia to aid in the 
approaching liberation.*** 
On May 20, 1914, Jacob Shefer, a Croat, attempted to kill 
r-- ----~----
:schmitt, I, 149 · 
"'*M.E .Durham, "Fresh Light on Serbia and the War", Contemporarr 
*** Austl·ian Red Book, 27 Review, CXXIV, 303, Sept. , 1928 : 
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Skerlecz in the Zagreb Opera House. .According to the 
n---.. --
.Austrian 
investigation, the attempt was instigated by Rudolf Hecigonja, 
who had been active in secret societies in Belgrade.* 
E. Summary of .Anti-Austrian .Activity in Serbia 
It is apparent that the anti-Austrian movement in Serbia 
was neither inconsequential, nor was it concealed. Narodna 
Odbrana was founded to protest against the annexation, and 
although ostensibly it abandoned revolutionary activity after 
190~, it never ceased to preach the theory that .Austria was 
Serbia's arch enemy, and that war was inevitable. The society 
was not secret; the pamphlet setting forth quite frankly its 
ideas was freely circulated. And since many officials were 
members, it is apparent that the government was well aware 
that the society was at least spreading propaganda against 
.A us tria. 
While Ujidinjenje ili Smrt was a secret society, many 
civil officials were members, and the government undoubtedly 
knew of the program of the society. To be sure, the goYern-
ment in 1914 came in conflict with the organization, but this 
was a matter of domestic policy, rather than any attempt to 
check the anti-Austrian activity of the society. 
The press made bitter attacks on Austria, even to the 
point of praising the deeds of assassins, yet the government 
did nothing. And there was strong indication that Serbia was 
-c.=~,-:---- ,_.,---~Schmi,tt,_I, 149;. _Austrian_Red Book, _27. _______ _ ·------~--- -·--· --~----
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at least partially responsible for some of the attentats 
preceding Sarajevo: most of those who made the attempts had 
oeen under the influence of Serbian nationalists at Belgrade, 
and possibly they had received from Serbs aid in carrying out 
their plans. 
The manifestations were apparant, yet the government did 
_nothing. The Sara~evo attentat may be considered a climax of 
all these manifestations against .Austria, for it will be seen 
that the perpetrators were to some extent influenced by the 
previous attempts, as well as by propaganda of the Serbian 
press and Narodna Odbrana. We shall find, moreover, strong 
evidence that the attentat was connected with Ujidinjenje ili 
Smrt. Sarajevo in one sense had its roots in the unsatisfacto T 
nationality policy of the Monarchy, but primarily it was the 
culmination of a move1-'lent which had been growing in Serbia 
since 1908. 
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V. THE ATTENTAT 
A. The Maneuvres 
1. Francis Ferdinand 
Francis Ferdinand, object of the attentat, was born Dec-
ember 18, 1863, a nephew of the Emperor. Since his accession 
to the throne was considered only a remote possibility, he 
,, 
, was trained in the army, rather than for politics. However, 
,j 
I 
after the violent death of the Crown Prince Rudolph in 1889, 
Francis Ferdinand found himself suddenly pushed into the 
position of heir to the throne. 
From the very first there was antagonism between Ferd~ 
inand and the Emperor, intensified when the Crown Prince fell 
in love wit~ Sophie Chotek, not of royal birth, and insisted 
on marrying her, even thOUfh the marriage must oe morganatic. 
After the turn of the century, the Archduke began to take 
a hand in administrative affairs, particularly in the army. In 
1906, at the insistence of Ferdinand, the Emperor reluctantly 
appointe~ General Conrad von Hotzendorf as Chief of Staff, and 
the inefficient administration of the aged Beck came to an end 
The Emperor disliked and distrusted Conrad, as an out-
spoken militarist, forever demanding action, and after Beck 
was removed Ji·rancis Joseph took little interest in witnessing 
I maneuvres and -------c·I•-·-c·c··· ---------. -_c ·---- --·-c.c:cc:c ·· in army affairs in general. Furthermore, the --~ .~ ·---- _______ £ ____ --. .. 
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towards his nephew • 
On the other hand, Francis Ferdinand was far from happy. 
He was pov~erless to settle questions of national policy, and 
was forced to acquiesce to much that did not coincide vlith his 
views. At the same time, his wife was refused any honors at 
court, adding further bitterness to the relations between 
Archduke and Emperor. 
More important than the ideas of the Archduke was the 
popular opinion regarding his programs. Because of the intim-
acy between Ferdinand and Conrad, it was generally believed 
that he shared the extreme views of the general, v1ho was 
constantly preaching the necessity of a war with Serbin, and 
even with Russia.* As a matter of fact, while Ferdinand stood 
behind Conn ad in all rna tters pertaining to the efficiency of 
the anny, he was opposed to any sort of military action 
against Serbia, and desired co-operation with Russia as well 
as with Germany. 
Ferdinand favored the settlement of the Jugoslav question 
within the Monarchy, by extending more privileges, and was 
even considering Triolism, as has been mentioned. Such a 
program failed entirely to win any friendship for him among 
... Jugoslav nationals. In the first place, they would not trust 
any projected settlement offered by Austria. Secondly, 
*Cf •• te-stimo'ny Uabrinovic, .rv1ousset, 82 
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Croats, rnther than Serbs, would benefit chiefly from Trial-
ism. And finally, settlement within the Monarchy was opposed 
to the favorite idea of t~e Jugoslav nationals--that of union 
of all Serbs, with Serbia in the role of Piedmont.* 
2. Plans for the Maneuvres 
Francis Ferdinand's visit to Sn:::·ajevo in 19i4 had two 
general purposes. First, as representative of the Emperor, he 
was to inspect the maneuvres being held near the city on June 
26 and 27. Second, the appearance of a member of the royal 
family was calculated to increase the loyalty of the Bosnians. 
In-line with this latter idea, Baron Musulin, in 1913, had 
urged the Archduke to visit Croatia, on the ground that such 
a visit would strenghthen the Catholic and other loyal elem:ent/s, 
and, in general, counteract the propoganda from Serbia.**rn 
September, 1913, Ferdinand had mentioned a visit t~ Bosnia to 
Conrad, and later Conrad disc~ssed it with ?otiorek. The 
announcement of the visit appeared in the press in March, 191 ' 
Serbophile writers have claimed that the maneuvres were 
a threat to Serbia, and many Serbians had the attitude that 
the visit was an insult to Serbia, especially so in view of 
the fact that the reception would be on June 28, Vidov Dan. 
As to the latter point, June 28 was the anniversary not only 
of Kossovo, but also of the marriage of Ferdinand and Sophie 
-~ * Fay, II, 1-15; Schmitt, I, 151-152; Redlich, 403-523; 
Caernin, 39-59; Seton-liatson, Sarajevo, 80-90. 
_ _--cc·-:.c-::--:_-:c·--· :=- --=-~---·F_ay_, ___ II t-: 44 ... 45 •: --:-::·:-c:::-:::-::=-c::··==- --=--=· -------:c:· ::·--·-------·-·----:- - -------------- ---- -----··----·----- -------
I· 
--------,_ 611 
-- ------l"'ch;t~k-, and we have no way of knowing whether either- consider.l 
ation entered into the choice of the date. Regarding the 
threat to Serbia, Fay points out that the maneuvres involved 
- !1 an entirely different mobilization from that VJhich would be 
used in the e{nt of action against Serbia, although, of 
course, the detail's of Austria's mobilization plans could 
not have been known at the time. However, the ground for the 
maneuvres was thirty kilometers southwest of Sarajevo, or 
exactly in the opposite direction from the Serbian frontier. 
Only in the eyes of those who considered Bosnia as irredenta 
could the maneuvres have appeared as an insult to Serbia. 
Serbian apologists make much of the point that Sarajevo 
was not properly policed. This was undoubtedly true. Bilinski, 
Joint Finance Minister, had nothing to say about the prepara-
tions~for the trip, which were entirely in the hands of 
Potiorek. However, since this was a military visit, and since 
the Archduke's relations mith the military administration 
were much more cordial than vii th the civil, there is some 
explanation for the neglect to consult VIi th Bilinski. 
General Fotiorek was an arrogant type of o~ficial, and 
the suggestion that there might be danger of a terrorist 
attempt would be haughtily dismissed. Possibly the Archduke 
may have been opposed to having a cordon of troops line the 
streets. At any rate, there was an insufficient police pro-
tection. Probably this can be considered another example of 
administrative stupidity--- ~otiorek was negligent as to 
__ police protection, while at, __ the.same .. time.-he .. was- advocating=~ 
62 
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measures of repression because of the dangers of radicalism.* 
·-----------=--==--=-=-=-=-=--~ -!-::-==---=-===-==--
j 
1: 
B. The Conspirators 
1. 'Princip 
Gavrilo Princip, who was twenty years old at the time 
he murdered the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was born in the 
village of Oblez, near Grahovo, in western Bosnia. He studied 
in Bosnia until May, 1912, when he came to Belgrade. At his 
trial he refused to give the reason for going to Serbia, 
saying, "That is my business". * 
In Belgrade, he associated with students who were filled 
vdth nationalistic and revolutionary ideas. Soon after he 
came to i:ierbia he enlisted for the J:Urkish nar, joining a 
comitadji group sponso~ed b~ Narodna Odbrana, and organized 
by Major Milan Vasic, who was prominent in both Narodna and 
Ujidinjenje ili Smrt. Princip was sent to Propuplje, a comitad i 
school near the frontier, for instruc~ion in the use of arms, 
under Major Tankosic. But before he was ready to be sent to 
the front sickness caused his dismissal and he returned to 
Belgrnde. ** 
Pr~ncip remained in Belgrade a short time, then went to 
Hadjice, in Bosnia, where he spent most of the winter---
ostensibly studying in preparation for his examination in 
i Belgrade, although it is more probable that he was engaged in 
* Mousset, 113-114 
** Mousset, 114 
I r 
I 
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secret revolution8ry activity.* 
Returning in March, 1913, to Belgrade, he passed the 
examinations for the fifth and sixth classes, taking both 
examinations at the same time. Later in the year he passed the· 
tests for the seventh class, after which he ~ent to Hadjice 
again, returning to Belgrade in hlarch, 1914. 
Llubja Jovanovic, Minister of Education, personally met 
Princip, and approved his examinations. "I advised and en-
cournged him - as I did many other youths who came to Belgrade 
from Austria-Hungary almost like emigrants - to continue his 
studying ani finish his schooling, because the greater his 
equipnent the better use would he be to the nation, and, in 
general, the better could he serve his own ideals." ** 
When J?rincip returned to Belgrade in March, 1914, he 
learned of the plans of the Archduke to come to Bosnia, and 
within a short time Priccip and Cabrinovic had decided upon 
an attentat. 
2. Cabrinovi6 
Nedjeljko 6abrinovi6, who threw the bomb at the Arch-
duke, was nineteen years old at t}le time of the attentat. He 
was an Orthodox Serb, born in Trebinje, Bosnia. The years of 
his adolescence were erratic, and for the most part unhappy, 
According to his account at the trial, he passed two classes 
i 
at the local trade school, but did not continue because his 
*Fay, II 100; Schmitt, I 210 
__________ .:':.~Jovanovtc, !.!After ___ vidov-l>an, "_ .Liv • .Age, May -11, 1925, 305=--c=,:=c·_--c·--cc.c:: 
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father would not let him. He went to another school, but 
because of illness he was forced to stop. He testified that 
his father mistreated him, so that he finally ran away from 
home. 
After leaving school he tried to find a trade, and 
finally got work in a Serbiam press at Sarajevo, at the age 
of fourteen. After working here for two years, he left when 
an older worker struck him. He then worked for a short time 
in a number of different places, including a socialist press, 
and a press at Belgrade ·where the an11rchist paper, nKomuna n, 
was printed. He helped compose this paper, and often argued 
with some of the writers---he being, at this time, a socialist 
I The writers invited him to discussions which started at 
wight and often lasted until one or two o'clock in the morn-
ing. They gave him books, including one which advmcated 
anarchy for the Balkans. 
Becoming sick, he returned to Sarajevo where he worked 
at the Narod press, until a strike, in 1912, forced him to 
leave. He stayed, for a time, at the home of a friend, ~ho 
was an anarchist, but was ordered out of the country---
because of calumny, he testified. 
Cabrinovi6 was soon authorized to return, but lacked the 
money. One of the students vJho frequented the "Oak Garland" 
cafe, rendezvous of Bosnian emigres, advised him that 
Narodna Odbrana might assist him, and introduced him to its 
secretary, Milan Vasio. 
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Vasic asked who he was, and what he was doing in Bosnia, -, 
i 
although Cabrinovic testified that he did not inquire as to , 
his ideas. Cabrinovic, during the interview, was carrying one j 
of de Maupassant 's books: 
He [Vasicl drew it from my pocket and asked what it 
VlaS. VI hen he saw it, he said the t this sort of reading 
was not for me, and gave me some publications of Narodna 
Odbrana,- the statutes of the society, and some nation-
alistic songs •••• rlith the books I received some money. 
"I do not know how to thank you for your kindness, n I 
said. In response he told me always to be a good Serb.* 
" Immediately afterwards Cabrinovic's father sent him money 
so he used the money Vasic had given him to buy books of his 
favorite Socialist anthors: Zola, Tolstoi, .Kropotkin, and 
other Russian translations. He returned to Sarajevo, but soon 
left for England. He only reached ~rieste, where he found a 
job. When t~e Balkan wars broke ant, he chafed at the tone of 
the Austrian press, and started for the front. The war ended, 
however, before he reached Belgrade. He wns recommended to 
Dacia, director of the Government printing office, where he 
found a job. However, the salary was small, he was miserable. 
and when he finally brought himself to write home his letter 
was not answered. 
While Cabrinovic v~as working at the state press, the 
urown Prince made a tour of inspection. Dacic, the director, 
l!J,fousset, 71 
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presented Cabrinovic to Prince Alexander, who was particulnrlYII 
interested in him as a Bosnian emigre. * r 
During the winter Cabrinovic frequented the "Oak Garland"\ 
i 
cafe, associating vlith comitadjis who were filled with hatred 
for Austria. The coming of Spring found Princip and 6abrino-
v1c working on their plans for the attentat. ** 
3. Gra bez 
Trifko Grabez was the son of an Orthodox priest. He was 
born near Sarajevo, and given a religious training, but under 
the influence of young people who had a "national religion", 
he drifted away from the teachings of his father. He was 
expelled from school at Tuzla for striking a professor, and 
in 1912 he went to Belgrade. 
Here Grabez associated with Princip, whom he had known 
since childhood, and here he, too, frequehted the "Oak 
Garland" cafe, and met Cabrinovic. He seems to have been. 
influenced to a great extent by Princip, with whom he lived 
during part of his sojurn at Belgrade, and when Princip 
informed him of his plans for the assassination, Grabez, then 
nineteen, replied that he, too, would join in an attentat.*** 
4. The Bosnian Group 
While in Belgrade, l'rincip, Cabrinovic and Grabez were 
*~ohmitt, I, 216-218 
!~xcept as otherwise noted, Cabrinovic • s testimony, M.ousset 
Mousset, 155-161 67-75 
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plotting the murder of the Archduke, Danilo I lie, in Sarajevo ,1 
was active gathering together a group of local terrorists 
Who would also make an attempt on the life of Francis Ferdi-
nand. There is a great deal of obscurity regarding the life 
of Ilic. He was one of the few conspirators eligible for the 
death penalty, ond ot the trial his testimony was equivocal: 
., he was apparently making an attempt to escape the death 
sentenoe. 
Ili6 was an Orthodox Serb, twenty-four years old at that 
time. He received a normal school education, and held a 
teaching position until sickness forced him to resign. In 
July, 1913, he went to Belgrade,but since he could not find 
employment he returned after two months, receiving his support 
from his mother, who operated a boarding house. * 
Ilic had been a friend of Princip since 1908.~* He was 
an associate of Gacinovic, and was very active as the center _ 
of the local Kruzhok, organized by the latter, as part of the 
national work in Bosnia. lt is probable that even before the 
idea of assassihating Francis terdinand was hit upon, Ilic 
** had been considering an attentat, vii th Potiorek os the victim.! 
v' Vaso Cubrilovic, second of the Bosnian group of 
conspirators, was seventeen years old. He had studied in the 
lyceum at Sarajevo, where a group of the stuients had 
* Mousset, 74-75 
** :Mousset, 188 
*** Schmitt I 219• 
t ' ' Cf9 below,p. 75-76 
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organized a nationalist society for the purpose of propagatin~~ 
the idea of political and social union of Serbs and Croats, 11 
but"i t did absolutely nothing." * :/ 
i 
that I 
I 
~T.hile Cubrilovic was still at the lyceum he learned 
II the Archduke was going to visit Sarajevo, and thought of 
1 attempting an assassination, but he lacked weapons. One of hisl. 
II 
clnssma tes introduced him tlb I lie, and he became a member of !I 
i 
i the conspiracy. ** 
I 
Cedo PopoviC wns eighteen years of age, and a native of j! 
a small village near Sarajevo. He attended the normal school 
at Sarajevo, where he made the acquaintance of llic, who was 
in a higher class • .About a month before the maneuvres, 
~opovic and Cubrilovic were discussing the visit of the .Arch-
duke, and Cubrilovi6 spoke of the necessity of "receiving" 
him. Popovic accepted the suggestion and joined the group of 
conspirators. *** 
l~ot so much is known of Mohamed lvlehmedbassic, who 
il 
1/ 
il 
II II 
escaped capture. He was a Mohammedan, and by trade a cabinet-// 
maker. Apparently he and Ilic were confirmed revolutionaries, /1 
plotting with Gacinovic, ****while Cubrilovic and ~opovic 
were enthusiastic but unreliable tools. 
* Jviousset, 206. 
**Mousset, 207-208. 
•** Mousset, 220-223. 
**** Cf. below, '14-'16 
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5. Ciganovic, Tankosic, qnd Dimitrijevic 
Besides those who actually went forth armed with bombs 
and pistols, to attempt to murder the Archduke Fr:::ncis 
Ferdinand, there were several people who were intimately 
connected with the plot, chief among them being Milan 
Ciganovic, 11a jor Voya Tankosic, and Dragou tin Dimitri jevic ..... 
Ciganovic was another Bosnian emigre, coming to Belgrade I 
in 1908. He secured a position in the Serbian national rail- 11 
!I 
ways, and during the Balkand'lars enlisted in the oomi tadji of ~~~ 
Tankosic. He jpined Ujidenjenje ili Smrt as No. 412, possibly, 
as has been noted, as representative of Passic. Princip il 
I 
reported that Ciganovic was a Freemason, and that he had 1 
informed Princip that the society had condemned Francis 
FerdinBnd to death. * Ciganovic was an intimate friend of 
Major Tnnkosic, and it was throp:gh the latter that he secured 
1 
the ammunition for the assassination. 
Major Voya Tankosic had been one of the lenders in the 
conspiracy responsible for the court murders of 1903. In the 
\' 
j: 
.I 
I! 
I! 
il 
period when Jugoslav nationalism was effulgent, he was one of II 
the foremost comi tadji lenders. and instructors. As a :commander,: 
in the Balkan wars, he distinguished himself for bravery, It ll 
I' 
has already been noted that among those to v1hom he had at one :j 
! 
:j 
!I 
'I 
* 11ousset, 135. 
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time or 
attempt 
another given instructions were Jucic, i·;ho made an 'I 
on Cuvaj, Princip, and Ciganovi c. As oomi tad ji leader~~ 
Tankosic had access to ammunition, ana thus we are to find 
him arming and instructing the three conspirators, Princip, 
v / * Cabrinovic, and Brabez. 
,I 
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Dragutin Dimitrijevic was chief of the Serbian lntelligenoe 
il 
Department. As member of the Central oommi ttee of Ujidenjenje 11 
ili SII123t he soon came to dominate the revolutionary activities:) 
:; II 
of the society. He was an inveterate conspirator - his name is'l 
linked with some eight or ten conspiracies from the time when j 
he helped organize the court murders of 1903, until his I 
,\ death in 1917, when he was convicted of having organized a 
" 
: 1 plot against Grown Prince .Alexander. He was ambitious, a 
,, 
I 
tireless worker, taking all responsibilities on his own 
shoulders. Yet, in spite of all his activity, he managed to 
conceal the part he played that very little can actually be 
proved about his complicity in any of the various attentats 
he is generally believed to have sponsored. ** 
6. Motives of the Assassins 
Oabrinovic was at first a socialist***, but by the time 
the plans for the attentat had been made he adopted nation-
alist-anarchist views. His associates of the Belgrade cafes 
1\ 
*seton-Watson. 111l'he Murder at Sarajevo", .!!'or. P.ff. 
::* Bogicevic~ passim 
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I were, for the most part, nationalist-radicals, naving as their 
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program the restoration of the ancient Serbiam empire. He 
believed that "it ~ould be possible to realize this ideal by 
means of an organization such as that which Mazzini created 
in ltaly". * 
The students had often spoken of the necessity of 
assassinating the Archduke: "It was considered as a means to 
and end, as an awakening of national consciousness and of 
vengeance".** Cabrinovic was, at first, more interested in 
assassinating Poti orek: "Y!hen the measures of exception were 
started, l believed that, if I ever ~ent to Sarajevo, l would 
commit an attentat against Potiorek." *** But Princip was in 
favor of the Archduke as victim, and Cabrinovic soon came to 
agree. 
Ca brinovi c( testified that among his a ssoolha tes "it was 
said that .b'ranois .:&1erdinand was a capable and aggressive man. 11 
I, 
I had read somewhere that he believed in a federated Austria, II 
)I 
and thought that Serbia and Montenegro should be joined to the! 
I / Monarchy •••• ! even read that the author, Nenadovic, ••• had 
said, rcursed be the Serb who trusts a German'. I am not a 
partis~.of the Monarchy; even less, when I think that at the 
head ~f this Monarchy is a man ~h~ is paid 60,000 cro~ns a 
day." ""'*"'* 
* Mousset 74 
. . t 
"'""' Mousset, 76 
""** J,lousset, 77 
**** Mousset, 82 
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Cabrinovic believed it was Serbia 1 s mission to Vi in ---~~ - -
I, 
I· Bosnia. This could be achieved only by war, and in this case, !/ 
I, 
II 
Serbia could v;in because Austria vvas "rotten". "A state which d 
I' 
II 
II 
is not national and which oppresses other nationalities 
II 
cannot be consiclered as having unity; the only bonds on whic~! 
,I II !I 
i! 
!J 
it exists are those of discipline; all its force rests on 
bayonets." * II 
There vms also a religious basis for Cabrinovic' s hatred 
1
1 
of Austria and its ~rchduke. The testimony informs us that 
Cabrinovic v'las an atheist, and undoubtedly a freemason, and 
that he hated .Austria because it was a Catholic state. He 
believed the Jesuits to be all-powerful in Austria, with the 
.Archduke himself accepting the counsel of a Jesuit.** 
Princip had begun reading revolutionary works such as 
those of Kropotkin, Bakunin, and Spencer three years before 
the attentat, at about the time he carne to Helgrade. He 
II 
II 
1/ 
I! 
I' 
ll 
il 
il 
II 
II 
II il 
lrl became a Jugoslav nationalist, with his ideal the deliverance '· 
of n11 Jugoslavs from Austria, and their union under Serbia • 
This ideal could be realized, he uelieved, by terror, by 
removing those who opposed union. All of those whom he met 
I' ,j 
II 
II 
'I 
I at the cafes uelieved in Serbia's role as the "Piedmont" but 
. I not all believed in terror. 
Princip nowhere gives us a definite reason for choosing I 
I 
the .Archduke as his victim. His principal a~s were to avengej/ 
'I 
i 
'*'Mousset, 83 
li'*.Mousset, 85-86 
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Gra.bez associated with the revoluticnary group of stu- II 
Serbs, to remove an ene~y to Jugoslav nationalism, and to 
incite the youth of Serbia to action against Austria.~ 
dents at Belgrade, but he was particularly intimate with Prin-!1 
I' I 
:
1
'! cip, and it was bw talking to the latter that his terroristic i 
ideas were developed. "As I had been banished, I naturally 
thought of our country •••• Kno~ing our miseries and the perse-
! 
I 
I 
I 
cuti ens directed against the Serbs in Bosnia, it wn s inevi tabl~ 1 
I 
I 
: that there should come to us the idea of making Austria pay 
honorably for her misdeeds, and of taking our vengeance on 
ij Ferdinand was chosen, rather than Potiorek, because the 
:: latter only executed orders from Vienna • .According to Grabez, 
"from him ~he .Archduk~ came, in general, all the evils from 
which Bosnia suffered; he was the worst enemy of the Slavs, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' i 
I 
I 
I 
a German who could only be an adversary of the great idea of I 
I the Jugoslavs. This was why such a man ought to be suppressed,:! 
!, according to my idea and that of Princip. n*** 
I' 
ii 
I Ilic testified at the preliminary questioning and at the 
'I 
lj 
1: 
I! ,, 
il 
,, !1 
:, trial that his political ideas we1·e in accord VJi th those of :1 
:: 1: 
1 
Princip: union of all Jugoslavs, opposition to .Austria, which il 
II 
\! was the force preventing this union, and hatred of Francis 
Ferdinand who incarnated the forces opposing Serbia. r11c 
"'Mousset, 115-155, passim; "The Confessions of the Assassin 
\!hose Deed r~ed to the '11orld \'!ar", H.F • .Armstrong, Current 
History, .XXVI, 701, August 1927 
"'*Mousset, 157 
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measures of exception and other oppressive features of the 
administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.+ 
v The testimony of Cubrilovic indicates that his beliefs 
were substantially the same as those of Ilic.~* Popovic, also 
of the local group, testified that "the one motive ·was the 
desire for vengeance, inspired by the persecution of the Slavs 
throughout the Monarchy."*** 
c. The Conspiracy 
1. The Origin of the Plot 
Of primary importance in the consideration of the natfire 
of the outrage against Austria is the origin of the attack. If 
the plot originated in Bosnia, or uith dissatisfaction caused 
by Austria's nationality policy as the chief cause, then many 
of Austria's complaints Y.iere groundless. If the plot was the 
result of anti-Austrian propaganda, or instigated either by 
Serbian societies or responsible officials, it was indeed an 
insult and a challenge to the Monarchy. 
Exactly how the plan to assassinate Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand originated can probably never b~ known. There are 
several possible explanations. Among the assassins themselves 
each seemed anxious at the trial to take all the credit for 
:fJviousset, 188-190 
*ltJI1ousset, 205-208 
***Mousset, 221 
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the idea of the attentat, while at the same time each was 
reluctant to inculpate other persons or organizations. 
75 
There is a possibility that the conspiracy may have had 
its origin in Bosnia, growing out of an earlier plot against 
Potiorek, with Gacinovic, Ilic and Frincip as the instigators. 
Sston-Vatson's version of the origin of the plot supports this 
tneory. Gacinovic~ he says, was in January, 1913, planning to 
murder Francis Ferdinand, but decided on a preliminary attentat 
directed against Potiorek, military governor of the provinces.J 
For this purpose he enlisted a group of young Bosnians, includ 
ing Mehmedbassic and lvlustapha Golubic. The plot was prepared 
in Toulouse. Gacinovic provided tne conspirators with weapons, 
as well as poison for committing suicide._ However, when they 
were about to cross the Austrian border, the youths :fearing 
an examination by customs officials, lost their nerve and 
,threw their weapons out of the windmrJ of the train."' 
Bogicevic gives another version of this antec~dent plot, 
based on the testimony of Mustapha Golubic, one o:t the conspir-. 
ators, and a certain Paul Bastajic. Gacinovio, in the :fall o 
1913, received from Major Tankosic/instructions to arrange for 
the assassination of the .Archduke and Potiorek. Gacinovic ... met 
witn Golubic and Mohamet Mehmedbasic, in Toulouse, in 1914, and 
arranged details of an attentat. Although it was thought 
(~ desirable to assassinate the Archduke, it was decided that an 
immediate attempt be made upon Potiorek, and accordingly 
________ ~-- __ ""Seton-Watson, 13arajevo, 74 
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1. Mehmedbassic was provided. with arms and poison, and was to 
' seek an auclience with Potiorek. But the plans failed to go 
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I While the attempt on Potiorek was being planned, accord-
ing to the Bogicevic version, Ga6inovic was also working on 
the more imposing plan for the assassination of the Archduke, 
and for this purpose sent for Ilic nnd Frincip to come to 
:1 Lausanne. I lie, however, first sent Princip to Tankosic for 
advice, but Tankosic decided that the attentat on Ferdinand 
1 should be carried out from nelgrade, and Gacinovic was accord-
ingly notified of the change in plans.~ 
i! 
The testimony at the trial to a certain extent bears out 
this version of the origin of the plot. Princip admitted 
travelling between Bosnia and Belgrade in the winter of 1914. 
Ilia, in his deposition after the murder, spoke of having :i 
II 
discussed with Mehmedbassic tJ1e idea of· an attempt on Ferdinan~~ 
'I 
even before it was known that the Archduke was coming to Bosnia~* 
At the trial he admitted receiving, in April 1914, a letter 
;: 
., 
,, 
II 
,, from Princip informing him that he was preparing an attentat. *1r 
The complicity of Dragu tin Dimitri j evi C and of the "Black II 
Hand" is assumed by practically all authorities on the immed- d 
:I 
iate origins of the vmr, although there is no direct evidence [! 
o~ Dimitrijevic's guilt • 
In 1923 Prof. Stanojevic published a pamphlet on the 
* Hogidevi&, "Nouvelles depositions concernabt l'attentat de 
'~'*Mousset, 189 !Sarajevo, LSF, IV, 21-27 
***:Mousset 190 
' 
!l 
:! 
~. 
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I 
Sarajevo plot, in which he stated that from information 
received from the Russian government Dimitrijevic learned 
77 
that Austria-Hungary had planned, at a meeting at Konopischt, 
to crush Serbia. A little later, from one of his own agents, 
Dimitrijeviclearned of the plans for the ~aneuvres near the 
Serbian frontier, and decided that the best manner of prevent-
ing an attack on Serbia would be the murder of the Archduke. 
Immediately afterward, Tankosic informed Dimitrijevic that 
two young Bosnians wished to murder Ferdinand, and Dimittijevi 
gave his approval to the plot. On June 15, he informed the 
0entral Committee of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt of the plot, but 
the committee rejected it, and Dimitrijevic tried to have 
the plot stopped, but either it was too late, or the conspir-
ators failed to obey his orders.* 
There is no documentary evidence to prove this version. 
Certain features of Stanojevic's account must be rejected, 
such as the influence of the Konopischt meeting, which was 
held on June 12, too late to have any bearing upon the plot. 
On the other hand, Ilic•s renunciation of the plot~may have 
been due to word from Dimi trijevio. 
~hether this version be true or not, it is hardly poss-
ible that Dimitrijevio v1as unaware of the plot. He was known 
to be partial to terrorism, and had been for years an intimate 
friend of Tankosic, so the latter must have informed him, 
*s. Stanojevic, Die Emordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand, 
Frankfurt, 1923, quoted by Sohmi tt ;I1 220-222 *~iousset, 196-197 
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times in the testimony at the trial the defendants mentioned i' 
a mysterious man with whom Tankosic and Ciganovic conferred,* 
and this figure was poss-ibly Dimitrijevic. 
I 
ir 
II 
'I 
,, 
Finally there is the controversial evidence regarding the lf 
'I 1-
Saloml:ca Trial, at which Dimitri jevic was condemned to death !i 
ij 
for an attempt to assassinate Crown Prince Alexander. It is 
doubtful whether such an attempt was ever made**, and the 
conviction YJas probably because Dimitri jevi d' knev1 too much 
about tne Sarajevo assassination, or because the government 
wanted to rid itself of the opposition of Ujidinjenje ili 
Smrt. Hhen the British war office interceded in behalf of 
Dimitri jevicr after his conviction, 1 t was intimated that his 
1. 
responsibility for the Sarajevo attentat had been determined~*~ 
Aftex the war the Serbian foreign minister stated that there II 
existed a document in which Dimitrijevic confessed to the 
II 
entire responsibility of the crime. ****The document, how ever, II 
I 
has never appeared. 
The most important of the conspirators were Cabrinovic 
and Princip, and each claims to have originated the idea of 
killing the Archduke. Both were terrorists, and undoubtedly 
i 
il 
I' 
II ,, 
I' il 
II ~ i 
both had played with the idea of a major attentat. Some time ll 
before Easter Cabrinovic received an anonymous letter which 
*Mousset, 
¥*~ogicevic, Le Colonel Dragutin 
***seton-Watson Sarajevo, 143 
.,..***Ibid 144 ' 
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contained a clipping announcing the visit of Francis Ferdinand 
to Sarajevo. On the clipping was written only the word, 
"Greeting". According to Schmitt, it was sent by a member of 
the Sarajevo revolutionary group who saw it in a Zagreb news-
paper.* 
Cabrinovic read tne clipping during his lunch hour, and 
snowed it to Princip, who said nothing. That evening, however, 
Princip talked aoout the visit of the Archduke, and suggested 
that the two plan an attentat against him. Cabrinovic hesi-
tated~ :for:~a.. tiiP,.e, but soon joined in the plan.""* 
Princip, according to his testimony, had already learned 
of the Visit of the Archduke, and he emphatically stated that 
he had already planned to commit an attentat before the arrival 
of the clipping.+** This was probably true, for Cabrinovic's 
testimony indicates that at the first opportunity for conver-
sation between the two youths after the clipping was received, 
Princip suggested the attentat. There is every indication 
that the idea was quite well formulated in Princip's mind, and 
v' 
that the clipping gave him a chance to suggest it to Cabrin-
ovic. This might be construed as evidence that Princip had 
been for some time conspiring with either Gacinovic or Tankosic.l 
although he says that no one incited him to the act.""*** 
*Schmitt, I, 227 
**Mousset, 75-77 
*""~dOUSSet, 150-151 
***~fousset 133 
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2. Preparation of the Plot 
Regardless of whether the plot was originsted by those 
who carried it out, or instigated by Gacinovic, Tankosic, or 
other revolutionaries, it soon required the assistance of 
older men schooled in terroristic activity and having at their 
disposal bombs and arms. 
After Prinoip and Cabrinovi6 had decided definitely upon 
the attentat, it became apparent that they would have to have 
help. Both testified that they considered appealing to 
Narodna O~brana, but they decided they could get no help from 
this source--"because we were not known". * 
It was, therefore, decided that Pri~cip should be respon-
sible for securing the ammunition. He decided to get in touch 
with Ciganovic, Bosnian emigre and fotmer comitadji, who, they 
knev1, ·had a store of bombs. l?rincip was already acquainted with 
Ciganovic, but, not considering tnat he was intimate enough tol 
speak about the attentat, a mutual friend arranged the 
meeting. 
Ciganovic listened to Princip's plan and agreed to help 
with the preparation&. He offered to furnish bombs, but 
because of the fact that a bomb would take a few seconds 
before exploding, he advised Princip that revolvers would be 
* Mousset, 78, 117. 
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necessary for the success OL the plot. Ciganovic had no 
revolvers but he promised to obtain them. * 
81 
Cignnovic secured the revolvers from Tankosic, and that 
meant informing him of the existence of the plot--if, indeed, 
he were not involved in its inception. Tankosic, before 
giving his assistance, asked to meet one of the conspirators, 
to determine whether or not they were capable of carrying 
out the attentat. It was decided that Grabez would be able to 
impress Tankosicmost, and he was dispatuhed with Ciganovic 
to see the Major. ~* 
Grabez testified that the Major alone received ~he~, 
although Cabrinovic had testified that there were other 
officers present.*** Grabez gave the following account of the 
interview: 
Are you one of them, and are you ready? I 
answered yes.--Are you determined?--Yes.--Can you 
shoot a revolver?--No.--How are you planning to 
carry it out?--I believe the most certain weapon 
is a revolver.--Thereupon he turned to Ciganovic: 
'Here, take this revolver; train him to shoot at 
the range•.**** 
Tankosic supplied pistols for the other conspiDators, and also 
furnished money.***** According to Bogicevic, Tankosic 
secured the revolvers from Dimitrtjevic, who himself purchased 
~ousset, 117~lle 
*~~ousset, 81-82, 118-119 
*** Mousset 82 
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Ciganovic gave instruction in shooting to Princip and 
;, . 
I 
Grabez. In the preliminary deposition, which hs tried to 
retract at the trial, Grabez said that a certain Milan Moji6, 
I 
, I 
i 
'i 
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an officer, instructed Cabrinovic in shooting, and after 
watching the efforts of each of the youths, judged Princip to 
be the most proficient. ** 
The youths started for Bosnia about the end of May, a 
month before the maneuvres, in order to escape the suspicion 
which might fall upon emigres from Belgrade entering Bosnia 
at the t~me of the maneuvres. Before they left, Ciganovic 
distributed to Cabrinovic, Princip, and Grabez a supply of 
bombs, revolvers, ammunition, cyanide of potassitun, one 
hundred fifty dinars in cash, and a letter to the frontier 
officer at Sabac. *** 
In recapitualtion it was noted that besides those 
actually carrying out the plot, Gacinovic, Tankosic, and 
Dimitrijevid were possib~t active in its inception; Tnnkosic, 
Ciganovic, and possibly Mojic approved of the plot and 
assisted in its preparation, and there is an indication that 
Dimitrijevic , with whom Tankosid ~as intimate, alno gave 
&ssistance to the conspirators. Of tnese five, at least four 
were members of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt, "The Black Hand". 
* Schmitt, I, 227 
** Mousset, 163 
***Mousset, 92, 119, 163. 
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3. The Journey to Sarajevo 
The three youths made their way,according to instructions 
given them oy Ciganovic, by boat, to tJ1e first frontier 
station, at Sabac. Here they sought out Captain Popovic, and 
gave him the missive borne by Princip comtaining only two 
letters(poesibly M.a., the initials of Ciganovi6). Princip 
informed Capt. Popovi6 that they wished to pass secretly. "He 
asked me why, and I told him that we had reasons. He shrugged 
his shoulders and said, 'I am not acquainted with them, but 
I can send you to the CIJptain of the frontier guards 1 ". * 
Popovic t11en assisted the youths in securing half-fare tickets 
on the railroad, giving them passes which said they were 
customs officials. 
The route was made out fox the group by Uiganovic, 
according to tne testimony. Cabrinovic gives a further 
suggestion that Capt. Popovic might have been given definite 
instructions about passing them--since he had been to Helgrade 
the day before.** 
The next stop along the route was Loznica, where they 
gave to the officer in charge a letter given to them by 
Popovic • .At Loznica, Princip and Cabrinovi6 had a quarrel, and 
* Mousset, 120 
** Mousset, 92, 231-232. Princip later admitted hnving told 
Coptain Popovic they had been sent by Tankosic, and that 
I 
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tion crossed the river at Ljesnica; Cabrinovicrproceeded 
alone to Zvornik. Here he was given a falsified passport and 
assisted in crossing the river, making his VJay by the "tunnel" 
to Tuzla, and from there to Sarajevo. * 
Princip and Grabez were given aid in making their way 
' 
secretly acrtss the border and to Sarajevo. Princip several 
times made ominous threats to secure the help that was 
necessary ini :order to pass secretly, and to insure that the 
peasants who helped them would say nothing about having given 
them assistance or having seen the arms. ** 
After the conspirators arrived at Sarajevo, the estrange-
ment continued until almost the time of the attentat. Princip 
and Grabez stayed at the home of llic, while Cabrinovic ·went 
to his father's house. In the three weeks before the attentat 
they only met two or three times, an_d Princip refused to tell 
Cabrinovic where the weapons were, .with the result that for 
some time Cabrinovic thoug"Lt that the attempt would not be 
made. However, two days before the attentat, Princip consented 
to allow Uabrinovic to participate._ *** 
The nature of the "tunnel" by which the assassins made 
their way into Serbia is well illustrated by the testimony of 
I 
~** j Veljko 6ubrilovio, * who assisted Princip and Grabez, and 
_ II forwarded their ammunition. 15ubril ovi C, president of a local 
I 
* Mousse t, 94-9 '1 
~~ousset, 92-96, 119-126, 164-172 
"'**Mousset 97-98 
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here mel; Bozo Milanovic, who was in charge of promoting the 
~ork of Hnrodna Odbrana in Hosnia. A year later Milanovic 
enlisted Oubrilovic as a Narodna Odbrana agent, in ~osnia, 
with duties consisting of forwarding propaganda, cooperating 
with local Serbian societies, and carrying out any special 
instructions which might be issued from Serbia. It will be 
noted that at the very time Cubrilovic was recruited for this 
work, the frontier officers were being established along the 
border, nnd Ujidinjenje ili Smrt was starting active revolu-
tionary work in Hosnia, under the guise of Narodna Odbrana.* 
The "tunnel" established for forwarding propaganda \-vas 
utilized, in lgl4, to smuggle Princip and Grabez into Bosnia, 
and 6ubrilovid assisted them. His curiosity was aroused by the 
bags Princip carried, and finally the conclusion came to him 
that they must contain bombs, and he immediately thought of 
the visit of the Archduke. tie questioned Princip, who saw 
that he understood, and admitted his intentions, but threat-
ened that if Cubrilovic betrayed the Dttentat, he, vdth his 
family, would be suppressed • 
.!Prom that moment it all became clear, [Cubrilovic 
testifie~. Bombs were being carried; two students 
were going to perpetrate an attentat. Behind ~rincip 
was a revolutionary organization, something very 
strong •••• I remembered what I had read of the 
*- " " ~ Cf. aba:ve, p. 48-bO ~- ~- ~- ~-~-~~- ~~ --- -----~--~---. ------~------------~ ! ________ --~ 
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• 
activities of the Serbian and Bulgarian revolu-
tionary organizations in Macedonia •••• ! kept 
my peace.* 
4. The Bosnian Conspirators 
Pro-serbian writers make muon of the fact that a sup-
plementary conspiracy was developed in Sarajevo, and that 
86 
a "bevy of assassins" lined the streets of the town in wait 
to assassinate the Archduke.•*rf this point be true, if a 
plot developed spontaneously, as it ~ere, within Bosnia, and 
not from the influence of Seroia, then the assassination 
might be considered as a national reaction to Austria's 
oppressive nationality policy. 
The local plot was hardly spontaneous, however. At its 
head was Danilo llic. He had been to ~elgrade, he was 
friendly with Princip, and apparently as an accomplice of 
Gacinovic, if not even an agent of Tankosic, he was a 
confirmed revolutionist. The same may be said of Mehmedbassic, 
who previously was conspiring with Ga6inovic • .l:!'urthermore, 
there is evidence that in the Sarajevo plot both were working 
under orders from Belgrade.*** On the other hand, Vasa 
*Mousset, 245 
**seton-~atson "The Murder at Sarajevo~ For.Aff. Apr.l925, 
***c:t:. above, p'. '14-76 LQQ4-507 
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according to his testimony, decided independently 
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Cubrilovic, 
• 
• 
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' 
that the Archduke should be assassinated, and applied to Ilic 
for weapons, while :Popovic w·;~as influenced by Cubrilovi6. * 
The local plot was quite different in quality from the 
~elgrade plot. Ilia, according to his testimony, changed his 
attitude toward the attentat, and would have withdrawn if he 
could.** The Archduke's car went directly past him on the 
fatal day, but he made no attempt •. Neither did Cubrilovi6, 
l'opovio, nor Mehmedbassic make an attempt, although they too 
had sufficient opportunity. 
Thus, even if we grant that the local group was not 
instigated from ~elgrade, it is apparent tpat the conspirators 
were of an entirely different character from tne Belgrade 
assassins. Grabez recognized this: "I heard the explosion of 
a bomb •••• As I knew that there were many conspirators, and 
that, except for Uabrinovic, all were of an inferior qua:J_ity, 
I concluded that it was he".*** There is nbthing to indicate 
tnat, had the belgrade failed, the Archduke would surely nave 
died at~)the hands of the local group oj assassins • 
• 
• 
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D. The Fatal Day 
In spite of a few inconveniences during the trip to 
Bosnia, the program went off smoothly. on June 26, after the 
first day's maneuvres, the .Archduke ancl his ·wife rode 
through Sarajevo, visiting some of the shops. Princip is 
reported to have come ammost face to face with the Archduke, 
but did not move, because of the presence of a ·man who was 
apparently a police agent, behind him.* 
Rain marred the maneuvres, but Sunday, June 28, was a 
perfect summer day. The streets had been decorated in honor 
of the .Archduke, and his portrait appeared in many windows, 
although the leading Serb paper, Narod, merely announced his 
visit and filled the rest of the columns with a patriotic 
account of YidoM »an and a picture of King Peter of Serbia.** 
The .Archduke 1 s party reached Sarajevo at about ten o 1 cloc 
in the morning • .According to the program, the Archduke was to 
pass dovm the main street, .Appel Quay, to the Town .tiall for 
the formal reception. On the return the party was to start 
back along the same route, turning off after a short distance 
into Franz Joseph Street, and thence to the museum and the 
Governor's residence for lunch • 
*Schmitt, I, 255 
"'* Fay, II, 122 
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bordered the Miljacka River, 
Ilic had placed the conspirators. The Archduke's car passed 
first Mohamet Mehmedbassic, one of the ~osnian conspirators, 
but he did nothing--indeed, when he heard the sound of a bomb 
a few moments after the car passed him he fled so hurriedly 
to Montenegro that he was the only one of the conspirators 
not captured by the police.* 
Just before reaching the !irst bridge. the Uumurja 
Hridge, the car also passed Vaso Cubrilovic, second of the 
local conspirators. ~ut uubrilovic, although he had both a 
bomb and a revolver, made no move--according to his testimony, 
he changed his mind when he took pity on the Archduchess 
sitting at the side of his intended victim.** 
Near the same spot llic was stationed himself, but he 
made no attempt because, according to his testimony, he had, 
by the day of the murder, renounced the attentat.*** Also 
near the bridge, Cvetko Popovic, another local conspirator, 
was stationed, armed with a bomb • .But when he saw the car he 
lost his courage, anct after he heard a bomb explode fled and 
hid his own bomb.**** 
Nedjelko Cabrinovic, armed with a bomb, had been walking 
up and down between the Hank of Austria-Hungary and the 
bridge. ~inding a place near the bridge where there were not 
* ],ay, li, 139 
** Mousset, 213-214 
**~ousset, 204-205 
***~ousset 223-224 , 
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many detectives, he waited casually for the approach of the 
car. As it neared the spot, he removed himself, as much as 
possible, from the crowd, not wishing to injure any more 
people than he could help. As the car came up to him, he broke 
the cap of the bomb against a post, and hurled it. He saw the 
bomb bounce off the hood of the car, and then turning around, 
swallowed his poison and tried to escape by jumping into the 
Miljacka, but was soon captured.* 
None of the occupants of the Archduke's car were injured, 
but severnl spectators and nn officer in the follovling car 
were hurt. 'J!he procession halted, and the wounded were sent t 
the hospital, after v;hich the party started off to the 11own 
Hall, driving more rapidly. 
~avrilo Erincip was stationed near the Latin ~ridge, 
armed vii th a revolver. As the Archduke t s party came in sight 
he heard the explosion of a bomb. With the crowd, he ran a 
ways toward the scene. and saw the automobiles)and Uabrinovic 
being captured. He thought that all was lost, and, for a 
.,. 
moment, he had the idea of killing Cabrinovic for allowing 
himself to be captured, as he expected that he himself would 
be killed. But when he saw the cars starting up again he took 
up hope. However, beca~se of the crowd, he could not see the 
Archduke as the car passed. He then made his way back to the 
tf Latin .l:lridge where he learned thnt the attempt had failed.** 
* Mousset, 100-101 
** Mousset 129 
' 
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The third of the conspirators from 1:1elgrade, 'l'rifko 
Grabez, had been wandering up and down between the Latin Hridge 
and the 1mperi~l Hridge, trying to find a place where the 
crowd was not too dense. Grabez finally stationed himself near 
the Imperial Hridge, and it was here that he heard the 
explosion of uabrinovic's bomb. Some time passed and he decided 
that the attempt must have been successful,when the car came 
in sight.He had no opportunity to fire, and he regre~ted that 
he had not kept his original position, for the car passed that 
point slowly. Hecause of the change in tne route on the~~ay 
back, Grabez did not see the .Archduke return from the Town 
.tiall.* 
When the .Archduke reached the Tor;n .tiall the mayor starte 
to read his address of welcome, which dwelt on the loyalty of 
the JjOSnians, .l!'rancis .b'erdinand started to protest at this, but 
allowed the Mayor to finish the speech. This was followed by a 
discussion of whether or not the prearranged program should be 
aoandoned because of the possibility of another attack. Genera 
l'otiorek insisted that no other attempt would be made the same 
day, and it was decided to continue ~ith the program. tlowever, 
at the insistence of tne Archduke, it was decided to visit the 
hospital to inquire about the wounded officer. 
On the return trip t~o precautions were decided upon • 
* Mousset, 173-174 
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attempt were made, it would probably be from the miljacka side.: 
I 
•• 
l 
t 
Second, instead of travelling along the narrow B~anz Joseph 
Street, as announced, the party would return over the Appel 
~q~.uay. 
Seated in the car, as before, were the Archduke and his 
il wife, and ~eneral Potiorek. When the procession reached ~ranz Jose~ Street, the Mayor's car, which was in the lead, turned I 
to the right according to the original plans. 1l'he Archduke r s I' 
chauffeur, either because he was unfamiliar with the town, or I 
because he did not understand the changes in tne route, starte~ 
! 
to follow, but Potiorek directed him to stop and back up to 
Appel Quay. 
Meanwhile, Princip, bearing in mind the scheduled route, 
had crossed to Franz Joseph Street •. He had just been accosted 
by a youth whom he took to be a spy, and was wondering whether .1 
he would be alone by the time the party returned, when the car 
rounded the corner. As it stopped to back out to Appel Quay he 
stepped out and fired two shots at Francis Ferdinand from a 
I distance of four or five yards. He had not seen the Archduchess 
I 
but hoped, with the second shot, to kill Potiorek.* 
Before he had a chance to swallow his poison Princip was 
seized. The Archduke's car turned and sped toward the Governor 11S 
I'· II 
residence v;here, within a few minutes, both the Archduke and 11 
1 his wife were dead.** I 
I I 
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VI. SERBIA'S GUILT 
1. The Aftermath of the Attentat 
1. Immediate Reactions 
The imrr1ediate reactions in Serbia have some bearing on 
certain of the questions regarding the assassination. The I 
attitude of the press towards the assassination is particularl~ 
notable. Piemont spoke of Princip as "a young martyr". Odjekl 
charged that "Archduke ]·'rancis ]1 erdinand was sent to Sarajevo I 
I 
on the day of national enthusiasm to celebrate a brutal mani- I 
testation of power and subjection." Pravda stated that "All 
murders and attacks heretofore committed in Austria have one 
and the same origin. The oppressed peoples of the monarchy 
were obliged to resort to this kind of protest, because no 
other way was open to them."* 
I The Serbian government, how ever, irnmedia tely adopted an 
I 
When the news of the assass-1 attitude of respectful sympathy. 
I 
ination reached Helgraae the government immediately put a stop! 
! to all public celebration and merriment in honor of St. Vitus 
i
l day. 
reported that the assassination "could only be the work of 
I 
i 
! The official organ, Samouprava, on the followin~ day 
'I 
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some irresponsible maniac",· and on July 3 further condemned 
the murder, pointing out that 
!be crime is all the more regrettable in that it 
was detrimental to the interests of Serbia, who is 
now convinced that it is to~ her interest to ue on 
friendly terms with Austria-Hungary, and who sincerely 
desires the establishment of good relations with the 
Dual Monarchy.* 
2. Serbian Neglect to Arrest the Accomplices 
The Serbian gonernment could have put itself in a better 
position in the eyes of tne ~orld, which was shocked at the 
outrage, ancl was sympathetic with Austria, if immediate steps 
had been taken to investigate the preparation of the plot, and 
to arrest any accomplices who mmght be in Belgrade. Such steps 
would have indicated that Serbia sincerely disapproved of the 
plot, and was willing to make an effort to end such outrages. 
Nothing could be gained by ignoring the fact that the ~lot 
was prepared in Belgrade, for the capture of six of the 
I conspirators meant thut Austria co~ld soon learn most of the 
II facts about the development of the plot, 
II 
Ill at Belgrade asked the Serbian Foreign Office what steps were 
I 
Two days after the murder, the Austrian Charge d 1Affaires 
II 
1i' *Schl;lli t t .1 462 I , , 
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"implying responsibility :for the crime on the part of the 
Serbian government", and said,"that up to the present nothing 
had been done, and that the matter did not concern the 
Serbian Government."* 
Milan Ciganovic was employed by the State Railvmy Departj 
ment, working there until the day of the attentat, June 28. I 
! 
Three days later, if the Austrian investigation may be believ~~' 
he :fled from the country, under advice from the Belgrade pre-! 
I 
feet of police.~* This is substantiated by the testimony o:f l 
Dr. Bogidevio, who says that on August 3 or 4, he was told by 
a Serbian station agent that he had just assisted Ciganovic 
in fleeing south.~** 
Ljuba Jovanovic, Minister of Education at the time, in 
recalling the events after Sarajevo, wrote that 
Vihen the Austrian stories arrived from Vienna to 
the effect that the assassins ba.d been sent to Sara-
jevo by an official of the Serbian Ministry of Public 
Works, a certain Milan Ciganovic, M. Passid asked M. 
Jotsa Jovanovic, then in charge of the department, 
who tnis official of his v1as; but M. Jotsa knew 
nothing about him, nor did anybody in his department • 
Under pressure from M. Passic they at last unearthed 
I 
96 L 
Ciganovi6 in some small clerical post 
administration •••• After that we heard from M. Jot sa 
that Ciganovic had gone off somewhere out of Belgrade.* 
It is further remarkable that the Belgrade prefect of 
I 
I :I police had stated that he did not know anyone by the name of 
Milan Ciganovid, and apparently his name was erased on the 
I railvlay administration books and changed to :Milan Danilov. ** II li I 
I 
All of this appears more si gnifioant in view of the fact l 
:::: ::g::::::,:::ep:::i:::t:n.::e::a:fi:a:::~::g:::v::r~:s I 
an important witness for the state in the Salonica trial.•*~ I 
Finally, Major Voya Tankosic was not arrested, even for I 
questioning, until after the receipt of the Austrian UltimatumJ 
which specifically demanded his arrest. In short, Serbia did 
nothing to indicate official disavowal of the outrage. 
B. Serbian Knowledge of the Crime 
J 1. Possible Complicity of Serbia 
1l I 
II Although there was undoubtedly a widespread anti-Austrian 
l , sentiment in Serbia, and although it was commonly thought that. 
1
1;1 ! war with Austria was inevitable, it can hardly be believed 
! 
1 that the Serbian government sponsored or approved of the 
• I 
I
I .IFJovanovic, Krv Slovenstava,:'Living Age, rv:ay 6, 1925, 306 II 
**Fay, II, 151 
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Sarajevo conspiracy, either as a protest to Austria or as a 
challenge to war. 
Seton-~iatson points out that June 1914 was not the time 
Serbia would embark on an aggressive policy. Although the 
country was elated at the results of the Balkan Wars, the 
ammunition was depleted, the army exhausted, and Serbian rule 
in the newly won territory not firmly established. The 
government, moreover, was in the midst of a struggle with the 
military party, and general elections had been called.* 
Finally, Serbia would look for assistance from Russia, and 
Russia in 1914 was not ready for war. 
A consideration of the quarrel between the government and 
Ujidinjenje ili Smrt demonstrates the improbability that the 
government would approve of a piliot sponsored by leaders of thiS 
society, if not by the society itself. The quarrel began when 
the military leaders in Macedonia took exception to the policy 
of the government in the new Macedonian territory, and by 
terrorist means tried to carry out tneir own plans. The 
government early in 1914 issued a decree giving civ~l author-
ities priority over the military, and soon afterward the 
quarters of Ujidinjenje ili Smrt were closed, and the govern-
ment attacked its organ, Piemont. At the time of the assass-
ination the outcome of the struggle had not been determined: 
I the government had been forced to retract the priority decree, 
I and elections had been called.*+ i 
cc ~ cc~+ ~f!~~iL i.~~i4~~r ~~~~KJ t~~ ~i~ ~~29QL ]l_o_~tc_e'J:[ C • 6 9 -'--=7=5-=-=-=-=--=-=·.:.:..·; ~~~ ~c •••-• 
~I 
I 
I 
il 
I 
I 
I. 
-
~~~AM6tWGt?Vi@Ni1ii!f¥WtrtP!Jifjitt!l&~~gtt.:pt.;.Jrt'~SiF1MDWfifti'fMMWta..t~t.J.Il' ------... ------------·-·······-····-~·--··--··-·.-··----------,---~~~ -'4 
98 
2. Serbian Cognizance of the Plans 
Although it seems improbable that the Serbian government 
li 
:! would have approved of the plot agnins t the Archduke, there is 
:I 
considerable evidence, although all of a controversial nature, 
that government officials were aware that a plot was being 
prepared. 
In 1924, in celebration of the outbreak of the \'Jar, there 
was published in Belgrade a commemorative volume, Krv Sloven-
stava (Blood of Slavdom), containing a group of articles by 
leading Serbs •. M. Ljuba Jovanovic, Minister of Education in 
1914, had been asked a year before to prepare an article, but 
he neglected to get it ready. ·~ihen the time for publication 
arrived, M. Jovanovicused for his article. ".After Vidov Dan". 
some recollections of the crisis which he had already written 
from his notes: 
.At the outbreak of the World War I was Minister for 
Education in M. Nicholas Passio's cabinet. I have re-
I 
I 
cently Tiritten down some of my recollections and some 
notes on the events of those days. For the present 
time I have chosen from them a few extracts, because 
the time is not m ~ for ~~~~ to be disclosed.* 
I do not remember whether it was at the end of May 
or the beginning of June, when one day M. Passic said 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'i 
:l 
J 
jl 
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Stojan Protic~ who was then Minister of the Inter-
ior, but this much he .said to the rest of us) that cer-
tain persons were making ready to go to Sarajevo to 
murder Francis J!'erdinand, who was to go there to be 
solemnly received un St. Vitus Day •••• M. Passic and the 
rest of us agreed that Stojan should issue instruct-
ions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to pre-
vent the crossing over of the youths who had already 
set out from Belgrade for that purpose. But the fron-
tier "authorities" themselves belonged to the organiz-
ation, and eli d not carry out Sto jan 1 s instructions, but 
reported to him (as he afterwards told us} that the 
instructions had reached them too late, because the 
ij youths had already crossed over ••• 
I· 
II 
I 
I 
I 
lj 
l1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
Thus the endeavors of the Government to prevent the 
execution of the plot failed, as did also the endeavors 
made on his own initiative by our Minister in Vienna, 
M. Joca Jovanovic, in an interview v~th M. Bilinski ••• 
On the afternoon of Vidov Dan I was in my house on 
the Senjak. About five o'clock an official of the 
Press bureau rang me up on the telephone, and told me 
what had happened that morning at Sarajevo. .Although 
I knew what ~ being prepared there, _ye~-' as I held 
the receiver, I felt as though someone had dealt me an 
unexpected blow; and a little later, when the first il 
!I ~-c ~~ecce l_".lt[lli_cs not __ i,n~the,,orJginol '·' ~-' ' . ~.~ cccc~ 
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news was confirmed from other quarters, I began to be 
overwhelmed with grave anxiety. 
M. Jovanovi~ goes on to describe the concern which he andl 
other officials felt lest Austria use this as an occasion to 
attack Serbia, an anx1ety allayed by the promise of Russian 
support. 
M. Passic therefore hoped that we should somehow 
pull through this crisis, and he made efforts ••• that 
Serbia might get off as cheaply as possible with the 
unhappy task of giving satisfaction to Austria-Hungary, 
and that she might reaover as quickly as possible from 
the blov1s whioh in such an affair were bound in any 
case to fall upon her. 
As is well known, the Government did not fail to 
do all it could to show their friends and the rest of 
the world how far removed we were from 'the--:?arajevo 
conspirators. * 
If such comments had been made by an obscure person, litt]e 
attention might have been paid them, but the damaging admiss-
i ions were made by a man who had 'ueen in the cabinet in 1914, 
j and who, at the time the article was published, held such 
II important Offices as president of the Skupshtina. Mr. Seton-
' 
II '~iu t son, an ardent champion of the Serbian cause, went to 
Belgrade, determined either to make Jovanovic retract his 
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statements, or make Passic give some explanation, but neither~~ 
attempt succeeded. 
• 
il 
I 
For a long time the government ignored demands for an 
explanation, but finally Professor Jelenic, former secretary 
to the Crown Prince Alexander, _denounced the Jovanovic assert-: 
ions as lies, and stated that the plot was carried out through 
I 
the co-operation of the "Black Hand" with certain Austrian 
agencies. This charge aroused the indignation of Milan G. 
Milano vic and u. A. Popovic, two of the surviving members of 
the society, who demanded proof of the assertions that it 
had conspired vd th the hated Austrians, after which "we shall 
produce all that we know anout the Sarajevo murder, on the 
basis of facts at our disposal."* 
It was becoming imperative that Passier make some sort of I 
statement, and on April 25, 1926, at a committee meeting of 
1 
the Radical Club, he made an attack on Jovanovi~'s actions, 
reported by tne party newspaper, Politika, as follows: 
Foreign correspondents had asked him whether he had 
known that the Austrian heir to the throne ~auld be 
murdered. He repudiated the idea. He had begged M. 
Jovanovic to contradict it, because it was not true 
that he had said this in a Cabinet meeting •.•. lmmed-
iately on his return from Bucharest he had advised 
the Narodna Odbrana to undertake nothing against 
.Austrin, for this would be dangerous. He had waited 
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for the denial of M. Jovanovic. M. Jovanovic had 
hesitated to give this and had not done so. 
He repeated the assertion that he had not said what 
M. Jovanovic had ascribed to him. He had even asked 
his colleagues, "Friends, have I not perhnps forgotten 
that l said this?" .And all of them affirmed that he 
had really not said this. 
It has not been denied, and now the question is 
being agitated. "So I must deny it. I do not know 
why M. Ljuba Jovanovi6 has said it, but he has said 
what is not true. He has done all tnis on his own re-
sponsibility, and if any one has done this, independ-
ently of an agreement with his colleagues, it is 
dangerous."' 
Jovanovic in response charged that the denial was , ., -
equivocal, that he had not said the information aoout the 
assassination hnd been given in a cabinet meeting. He offered 
to bring forward proofs of his assertions, provided that the 
·Prime I,Hnister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs would assume 1 
I 
responsibility for his doing so, but this they declined to do.~j 
There is considerable evidence in substantiation of 
Jovanovic's statements. Vihen the .Austrinns in 1914 crossed the 
Serbian frontier they captured certain papers and diaries kept 
by Kosta Todorovic, frontier guard at Loznica, and among these 
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was found an order to stop the assassins.* Mousset reported 
I 
_!I 
II 
II 
II 
that on March 26, 1925--before the Passic denial--Jovanovio 
had affirmed to him that 
the preparctions for the attentat were revealed to 
Passic, Jo~an Jovanovic, Serbian minister at Vienna, 
and myself--no doubt in rather vague form--at the 
end of May or the beginning of June by Milan Priv-
icevic'. ** 
An Italian writer has also published an account of a 
conversation during the Serbian retreat in 1915 with Milan 
Georgevic, formerly charge at Constantinople, who stated that 
news of the conspiracy organized by the "Black Hand" began 
to leak out in high circles several weeks before the 
murder at Sarajevo. Passic learned of it in the first 
fortnight of June, and in the face of the insolence of 
the "Black Hand", yet fearing greatly the consequences 
of an attempt on the Archduke, w~s left rather embar-
rassed; after several days of hesitation as to what 
to do, he communicated the news to his colleagues of 
the government and indicated the dangers which might 
arise. His decision to obstruct the plan of the con-
spirators as far as possible met with the full approval 
of the other ministers. but the conspirators had 
already passed the frontier.*"'* 
~~ay,Il, 73-14, 82-83 
Revue d'Histoire *A. Mousset, "L'attentat de Sarajevo", 
. Moderne, quoted by Schmitt, I, 235 
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Yet another fact in corroboration of Jovanovic's state-
ment is the warning to Bilinski, which will be discussed 
presently. On the whole, there seems to be no reason to 
believe that Jovanovic invented the story. Seton-Watson infers 
J 
that he made his statements to gain notoriety, but if such I 
were the case, he would have chosen a less obscure publication~ 
Actua11y, the tone of the article indicates that he gave no I 
especial importance to the fact,~and afterward he had the 
attitude that he had made no revelations of facts not generally 
known in Serbia in 1914. And the fact that he was not called 
upon for proofs substantiates the evidence that the govern-:-
ment knew something of the preparation of a plot, although 
that knoTiledge was probably quite indefinite. 
3. The Serbian Warning to Austria 
Before considering the evidence regarding a possible 
warning given to Austria that a plot was being prepared 
against the .Archdul;:e, it must be noted that the government 
was in a delicate position. lf the government had knowledge 
of the plot, there were several reasons why ~assic might 
hesitate to warn Austria. ll'irst, in acknowledging the exist-
ence of the plot, Serbia would accept some responsibility for 
it, and since the assassins left Belgrade so long before the 
maneuvres, the government could do little to prevent the 
attentat. Second, the plot might fail, and in such a case 
warning would only be an acknoTiledgement to Austria that 
!i 
II 
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subversive activity against the Monarchy had its roots on 
Serbian soil. On the other hand, if Passicwarned Austria 
it would show that Serbia sincerely disavowed terrorism direct 
ed against the monarchy; and the re~ponsibility for protect-
ing the Archduke might be considered shifted to Austria. 
In general, assuming that he knew of the plot, Passic wa 
faced with a difficult problem. \Thatever he did could, and 
probably would, be condemned oy flus tria. Astute diplomacy, 
therefore, might suggest as a way to avoid the worst pitfalls, 
an unofficial "suggestion", which Serbia could later either 
claim or disclaim, as the need might be. I 
Immediately after the assassination, and continuing unti] 
after the war, there were reports of a warning given to the I 
Austrian government, none of which, however, can b~ credited.~ 
In 1924, however, M. Jova Jovanovic contributed to a Vienna 1 
newspaper, the following account of a warning which he gave 
to .Austria: 
I am glad to give you an authentic account of the 
warning given to the .Archduke, which came from me and 
arose from my own initiative. I was at that time 
Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy to Vienna. And I 
learned that the tleir to the Throne intended to be 
present at maneuvres in Bosnia •••• After i had duly 
weighed all these facts, 1 resolved to visit Dr. von 
+schmitt, I, 240-243 
i ' 
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Bilinski, who was then Jnnance iviinister and Minister 
for Bosnia. So far as I remember, my visit took 
place about June 5--thus twenty-three days before the 
assassinati~n •••• I said to Minister von Bilinski: 
" ••• 1 can assure your Excellency that the Archduke's 
visit will arouse the greatest discontent among the 
Serbs, who must regard this as an act of provocation • 
••• Among the Serb youths there may be one who will 
put a ball-cartridge in his rifle or revolver in place 
of a blank-cartridge, and he maJr fire it, and the 
bullet might strike the man giving the provocation. 
~herefore, it would be ~ood and reasonable that the 
Archduke shou1d not go to Sarajevo; that the maneuvres 
should not be held on Vidov Dan; and that they should 
not be held in Losnia.* 
106 
Bilinski, although he could see no danger, promised to make 
representations to the Archduke, but no changes in the plana 
1 were made. 
~he facts of this account agree with the facts given in 
' the article, 11After Vidov JJan," by L. Jovanovic. Bilinski in 
his memoirs failed to mention any such visit and warning. 
However, it is probable that he deliberately avoided the sub-
ject; during the war, in a letter to an Austrian historian 
• who asked him directly about the alleged ·warning, he said that 
II 
Ill *ueues Viener ~ageblatt, June 28, 1924, quoted by .ll'ay,II,l58-9l 
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over this aspect of the affair he "wished to draw the veil of 
oblivion."* 
Paul ~landrsk, Chief of the Press Section in Bilinski's 
Finance Minister in 1914, in 1926 confirmed the essential 
features of M. Jova Jovanovic's statement: 
In May, 1914, when the first announcements about the 
.Archduke ~·rancis Ferdinand's trip ••• began to spread 
among the public, Jovanovic appeared for the last time 
at the office of the Joint Einance Minister. Upon his 
arrival he began to speak at once about the proposed 
maneuvres, and expressed the fear that the Serbian 
government might regard them as a provocation. J:l'urther-
more, he would like to bring to the serious consideration 
of the Joint ~inance ~inister whether the patriotic 
demonstrations inevitaole at the appearance of the 
future ruler of the Monarchy would be likely to arouse 
bad feelings on both sides of the frontier. tie begged 
I Bilinski not to regard his remarks as an official com-
;! 
munication. tie was moved only by the desire to prevent 
everything which might possibly, even though temporarily, 
distunb the negotiations which had begun for the mutual 
improvement of the mutual relations.·"* 
Apparently a warning of some sort was given, but whether 
*Fay,II,l62 
**Flandrak, Heues Viiener tJ ournal, April 26, 1925, quoted by 
~ay, II, 160-161 
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it was based on knowledge of the plot is uncertain. Jovanovic 
only suggested the possibility of danger. If the Serbian 
government was aware of the plot, its knowledge was probably 
vague. And furthermore, an indefinite suggestion would have 
served as Sufficient warning without embarrassing Serbia. 
Jovanovic states that the warning was given entirely on his 
own account, yet it is hardly probable that he would have I 
made this step without orders from his superiors in the Foreign 
Office. He communicated the warning to Bilinski because his 
relations with Berchtold were not cordial, and for some time, 
with the approval of the latter, Bilinski had received Jovan-
ovic's diplomatic representations, communicating them to 
Berchtold.* 
c. The Ultimatum 
1. Charges Made in the Document 
The Austrian note was despatched from Vienna on July 20, 1 
I 
and was to be presented by Baron Giesl to the Serbian Govern- 'J 
menton July 23. The Ultimatum was to be accepted unconditiohi 
ally within forty-eight hours; when Serbiats reply was found 
to contain conditions, ~ustria declared war on her. The note 
will be analyzed, to determine whether, in view of the facts 
regarding the Jugoslav national movement and the assassination! 
*Fay, II• 152-166; Schmitt, I, 241-248 
~ .. 
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the complaints of Austria were justified. Serbia 1s reply wil~ 
be analyzed, in an attempt to decide whether it represented anll 
honest acceptance of the demands, or equivocation. 
The Ultimatum opens with a review of Serbia's declaration, 
I in 1909 to recognize the fait accompli in Bosnia, and to 
renounce her attitude of protest. 
The history of recent years, and. in particular the 
painful events of 28 June last, have shown the eXistence 
of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a 
part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Mon-
archy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye 
of the Serbian government, has gone so far as to make 
itself manifest on both sides of the Serbian frontier 
in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of out-
rages and murders. 
Far from carrying out the formal undertakings con-
tained in the declaration of 31 March, 1909, the Royal 
Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these 
movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations 
of various societies and associations directed against 
the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language 
on the part of the press, the glorification of the 
perpetrators of outra~es, and the participation of off-
icers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has 
permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruct-
ion, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a 
I 
! 
! 
I 
II 
i' 
! 
'' 
.I 
,. 
I 
' il 
i 
nature to incite the Serbian population to hatred of 
the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. 
'i il 
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In response to these charges the Serbian Government ass- , 
the protests which were made both from the tribune of 
the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and 
actions of the responsible representatives of the state 
I 
: 
,, 
I 
••• have not been renewed on any occasion as regards 'i 
the great neighboring Monarchy ••• 
The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for 
manifestations of a private character, such as articles 
in the press and the peaceaule work of societies--mani-
festations which take place in nearly all countries in 
the ordinary course of events, ana which are as a gen-
eral rule beyond official control. 
The complaints of the Austrian Government are apparently 
'l justified. Unrodna Odbrana was founded, with official encour-'1 
d 
,I 
ngement, for the purpose of protecting Serbian interests in 1 
• .i Bosnia. Serbian officials JOined in the v1ork of the society, 1 
t! 
'I 
and in the terroristic work of UjidinjenJe ili Smrt. Bosnian ,i 
:I 
l 
emigres were aided by the bureaucracy and encouraged by secret:i 
ii 
societies to work for Serbian union. .Anti-Austrian props- 1j 
~ I 
ganda was not only printed in Serbia, but it was sent, vm th ;1 
.. :· the connivance o! frontier officers and agents of' narodna 
Odbrana, into ~osnia. Plots were prepared in Belgrade, with 
assistance by comitadji leaders, and the perpetrators were 
.i 
~ \ 
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glorified in the Serbian press. 
The Serbian reply admits that no- attempt v.as made to 
check any of the manifestations ·which were of a private 
It II ::::::~::: •and as such beyond the control of the Serbian 
I, 
i 
Regarding the assassination, Austria charged that 
It results from the deposition and confessions of 
the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of 28 June 
that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Bel-
grade; that the arms and explosives with which the 
murderers were provided had been given to them by 
Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the 
Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into 
Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized 
and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier 
service. 
In answer to these charges Serbia repl~ed that 
The Royal Government has been painfully surprised by 
the allegations that citizens o~ the Kingdom of Serbia 
have participated in the preparations for the crime 
committed at Sarajevo; the noyal Government had ex-
pected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation 
of all that concerns the crime; and it stood ready, in 
I 
li 
I 
I 
I. 
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end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to 
tne tranquillity of the Monarchy. 
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To achieve this end Austria set forth a list of demands 
whicn must be met by the Serbian government. The first was 
;! a formal assurance that Serbin condemned the anti-Austrian 
I, 
·I 
i 1 manifestations, this assurance to ue witnessed by publication !: 
I 
! I in its Official Journal of a notice dictated by Austria. tl 
I. 
,, 
I 
.. 
l ~ 
:' 
.1 
Serbia agreed to this, making certain changes, however. 
The first paragraph, beginning, "The Royal Governypent of Ser-
bia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary~ 
v1as changed to read, "condemns all propaganda". In the second 
paragraph, expressing regret that "Serbian officers and fun-
ationaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda 
Serbia inserted the phrase, "according to the communication of 
the Imperial and Royal Government." 
The additional demands, with the replies made by Serbia, 
were as follows: 
ll) Suppression of any publication directed against the 
Monarchy. The reply stated that Serbia would introduce at the 
next Skupshtina a law providing for punishment of the press • 
{2.) Immediate dissolution of Narodna Odbrana, and any 
other anti-Austrian societies. Serbia acceded, protesting, 
however, that there was no proof that Narodna Odbrana had 
engaged in propaganda against Austria. 
(3.) Elimination from the public instruction of all 
propaganda against Austria. Serbia agreed to remove such 
,, 
I! 
'I /---~ --------1~!-=m=a=t=e=r=i=a=l=,="=whenever ~h.~ i~pe rial and. Royal Government shal~14 f 
I 
I 
furnish it with facts and proofs of such propaganda.n 
( 4.) Removal from military and civil service of any 
officials wnose names should be communicated to Serbia by Aus-
tria, as having engaged in propaganda. This was accepted by 
Serbia. ~- - ---~ -~"' 
(5.) The collaboration in Serbia of representatives of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the 
subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity 
of the Monarchy. Serbia accepted this demand insofar as it 
agreed with international law and criminal procedure. 
(6.) Judicial proceedings against accessories to the 
ji plot, with delegates from the Monarchy taking part. Serbia 
rejected the latter part of the demand as being inconsistent 
with international law and criminal procedure. 
{ 7. ) The arrest of Tankosic and Ciganovic. Serbia arres -
'I 
ed Tankosic, but, as has been noted, Ciganovic had by this tim~ 
II fled. 
(8.) Punishment of the frontier officers who had alloweal 
tne conspirators to pass, and prevention of illicit traffic inj 
arms and explosives across the frontier. This was accepted. 
(9.) Explanatiom of utterances by high officials after 
the crime, voicing hostility to Austria-Hungary. Serbia accep~ 
tea on condition that Austria communicate the passages in 
question and prove that the remarks were made. 
On the whole, the charges made in the Ultimatum were 
-'1 -----~--
1 
115 I 
=========- ~======== 
founded upon established facts, none of Vlhich could be 
I honestly denied by Serbia. The demands, in view of the nature 
'I I of the outrage, were for the most part not unduly severe--- ,: 
after all, Serbia had broken her agreement, mn de in 1909, to ij' 
live 11 on good neighborly terms" with .Austria. But in includin~ 
II in the Ultimatum demands which would compromise the independence 
of Serbia, .Austria must face the responsibility of so acting 
as to make war unavoidable. * 
*~notations from the Austrian Ultimaturn·.and the Serbian reply 
taken from the Austrian Red book. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Austria-Hungary, a polyglot empire composed of various 
1 race groups clamoring for greater autonomy, adopted the unwise 
!1 
,. 
,. 
:: policy of repression, partly because of the dominance of the 11 
ii J 
Magyars, who feared the loss of their position of power, partlY: 
! 
because of the fear that increased autonomy would set in motion 
! 
,[ forces of disintegration. A crucial point within the Monarchy ; 
II 
" :I was Bosnia, where, instead of the wise and progressive policy 
I 
!i :1 
11 necessary to satisfy the poverty-stricken population, repress-
i 
.I 
I! 
ive administration was invoked. Within Serbia it was common 
to regard Bosnia as irredenta, and .Austria as the enemy of 
I! Serb unification, tne great goal of the Serbian people, and 
'i these ideas were stressed by Serbian societies, the press, 
;; 
!j lecturers &nd public instruction. As this nationalism became 
I. 
~ I 
1 more intense, it developed an offshoot, which believed in 
I' 
.! 
:I 
1 
terrorism rather tnan simply propaganda. The Sarajevo attentat 
1 i was at once the ultimate result of the anti-Austrian propa-
I 
!i 
II 
I' 
il 
I 
ganda and the climax of the program of terrorism. 
.Austria has borne, and must continue to bear, the onus of. 
having declared v;ar against Serbia. At the same time, it must 
be understood that Serbia was not the innocent victim of Aus-
' trian egression. The Serbian Government was guilty of toler-
ating activities v1hich, unless checl::ed by the Government, 
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would result in such insults to Austria as the Sarajevo 
attentat, and which, in the end, must inevitably bring on 
war. 
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